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1. Introduction 
The present report is the fifth in a series that the Chr. Michelsen Institute has been 
producing annually on socio-economic and political developments in Angola. 
Commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, these reports are meant to 
provide an independent analytical perspective on the country’s development trends, to 
facilitate the work of the Norwegian development assistance community involved in 
Angola and to stimulate debate about the issues involved. In previous years, the reports 
have covered selected themes such as Angola’s system of higher education (2000), the 
role of national and international NGOs in development (2001), aid in the context of 
peace (2002) and democratic decentralisation (2003). This year, the theme is the 
political situation in Angola in the context of the upcoming parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2006-2007. 
 
Democratic multiparty elections are a novelty in Angola – the only such exercise in the 
country’s history was carried out in 1992 and had disastrous results: the main 
opposition party refused to accept the results of the first round of the presidential 
election and plunged the country into another decade of war. New elections are 
therefore seen by almost all as an event of tremendous significance: many see new 
elections as a crucial step to consolidate the process of democratisation, which is still 
fragile and ambiguous; others hope that elections will correct some of the ills that mar 
current governance in Angola – that the need to win votes will force the regime to clean 
up its act, improve transparency and accountability and deliver on an agenda of basic 
social services.      
 
This study articulates the following perspectives: 
 
1. Angola is a difficult development partner and the strategic objectives of 
Norwegian assistance to Angola, while commendable, are problematic. 
2. Angola may be well-endowed in natural resources, but it is not a rich country – 
it is a very long and difficult way from mineral deposits to dinner on the table or 
a place at school for every child. Education, which people in Angola desperately 
lack, may be the only known mass antidote to the “curse of oil”. 
3. Elections will probably not bring regime change. The most likely outcome will 
be a larger majority for MPLA in Parliament. 
4. The historical opposition issued from the liberation movements, which were 
both defeated and co-opted by the government, seems at present unable to 
present voters with an alternative because it is too divided and institutionally 
weak. 
5. Some of the organisations in civil society that had been brought to life as a peace 
movement in a context of war have now been overtaken by the events. They 
were wrong in assuming that peace could not be achieved militarily, and they 
may be wrong in insisting on a restorative reconciliation rather than on forward 
looking socio-economic growth policies. 
6. Due to the weakness of the opposition, progress in the area of governance will 
to a large extent depend on reform within MPLA.  
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7. Angola has no political prisoners and no formal press censorship – political 
dissent has to a large extent been co-opted or bought out through the 
discretionary and often illegitimate use of public resources. Measures to impose 
accountability and transparency may threaten this political culture and some 
crucial aspects of the stability of the system. 
8. In terms of opportunities for donor assistance, the judiciary  represents a sector 
that offers promise in terms of the feasibility and impact of such assistance. We 
see a potential greater role for donors in terms of strengthening the judiciary in 
numbers and quality and to promote its independence from the executive and 
legislative branches of government.  
9. There is also a need to improve the quality of the political processes – for 
instance, by supporting independent, quality-oriented media outlets in their 
struggle to establish themselves; by stimulating formal political debate in 
academic circles and elsewhere; and by supporting research that improves the 
quality, transparency and accountability of governance.     
 
This study benefited from the collaboration of many individuals and institutions, 
particularly all those who made themselves available for lengthy interviews by the 
author during his visit to Luanda in August 2004 (see Annex 1), the staff of the 
Norwegian Embassy in Luanda who provided the necessary introductions, and the 
colleagues in the Angola-team at CMI for their support throughout the process. The 
study draws liberally on information accessed through the Internet, including newswire 
compilation services such as those run by Prof. Franz Heimer (Angola News) and 
António Teixeira (Africaluso Yahoo-group) or discussion lists such as Kathleen 
Sheldon’s on Portuguese-speaking African countries at Humanities-Net.  
 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to all who assisted him, and to exempt them 
from any responsibility for the views put forward in this study.    
 
 
Bergen, November 2004 
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2. Socio-economic trends 2003/2004 
On the socio-economic front, 2004 was a good year for Angola – with the latest 
estimates of GDP growth standing at just below 12 per cent for the year. Angola’s 
economy is based (for about 54% of the GDP in 2001) on oil incomes, and these are 
determined by the volume of production and the price of oil in the international 
markets. Developments on both accounts were very favourable, and in the case of the 
latter, well beyond expectations. With the coming online of new fields, crude oil 
production increased past the 1 million barrels a day mark. The price of crude, which 
the Government had cautiously projected to be about US$ 23 per barrel in 2004, 
reached nominal record levels above US$ 50 per barrel, bringing in hundreds of 
millions of US dollars of additional revenue. Some calculations reported by Angolan 
media suggest that for the first half of 2004 alone, additional revenue amounted to US$ 
270 million. 
 
Angola is also one of the world’s largest producers of diamonds – ranking forth in 
terms of value of official production, although market sources believe that with 
smuggled production, Angola is actually the third largest producer. It is considered to 
have some of the world’s highest grade diamond deposits. According to official sources, 
reserves are estimated at 40 to 130 million carats in alluvial and terrace deposits, and 
180 million carats in kimberlite pipes 
(http://www.angola.org/business/sector/mining/basic.html) – although much of the 
country remains unprospected. Official diamond production in recent years (2000-
2003) has generated about $700 million annually: total production, including 
illegitimate mining, could exceed US$ 1 billion annually. Official diamond exports 
represent somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the GDP. In terms of weight, 
official estimates put production figures at 6 million carats in 2004 and industry 
sources predict that Angola's annual diamond production could reach 10 million carats 
by the end of 2005. 
 
These good results on the extractive industries front has enabled Angola to pursue 
what the IMF calls “a fragile stabilization” (Gasha 2004), characterized by declining 
inflation rates and greater stability of the national currency. Prices, which had risen by 
over 100 per cent annually in 2001 and 2002, rose by only 77 per cent in 2003. The 
Government’s objective was to bring inflation down to 20 per cent in 2004. While that 
objective will certainly not be met (prices had already risen by some 22% in the first 
eight months of 2004) the Government is still expected to be able to contain inflation 
to less than 50 per cent for the year – which would still be a remarkable achievement. 
 
The national currency, the kwanza (Kz), has also traded in a narrow band between 80 
and 88 to the US dollar since September 2003, with practically no difference between 
the informal and the formal currency markets. The “strong kwanza” policy, which 
experts believe to be sustained by massive sales of foreign exchange reserves by the 
central bank, is one of the main reasons behind the slowing of inflation. It also 
amounts to a subsidy of importations, which benefits all consumers – but especially the 
urban elite. 
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The Government in May 2004 reduced its subsidies to fuel, water and electricity, 
raising the price of petrol to 20 Kz/litre (approximately US$ 0.25). The Government 
has indicated that it would eliminate such subsidies through a process of gradual 
reductions. Fuel subsidies cost US$ 647 million in 2003, or 12 per cent of the national 
budget. This reduction helped cushion to some extent the impact of the rising oil prices 
on Government expenditure: since Angola has little oil refining capacity and imports 
some 90 per cent of its fuel, increases in international oil prices lead to more costly fuel 
subsidies. 
 
These macro-economic successes have important political implications. They are based 
on a number of arbitrations and trade-offs that will please some constituencies and 
hurt others: the standing of the ruling party will be strengthened among those sections 
of the population that benefit from macro-economic stability – but at the same time life 
will become more difficult for those who rely on goods (such as petrol, cooking gas) 
and public services (electricity, water) that are being less subsidised than in the past.  In 
any case, the macro-economic successes have pleased domestic business interests  and 
the international donor community and strengthened the hand of the reformists in 
MPLA and the Government, particularly the Finance Minister, José Pedro de Morais 
and the Deputy-Prime Minister Aguinaldo Jaime, who oversees the economic and 
financial portfolios. They are both economists with distinguished careers: Pedro de 
Morais had served as Planning Minister in the 1990s and was subsequently an 
Executive Director at the IMF; Aguinaldo Jaime is the former Governor of the national 
bank.  
 
There are numerous other signs of progress on other fronts as well. According to a 
recent overview provided by the UN, in the education sector, official government 
figures now indicate that one million more children are in school, compared to one 
year ago. In the public health sector, five million more children have been vaccinated 
against polio in the past two months, bringing Angola closer to polio-free status and 
towards its goal of reducing child mortality rates. In terms of infrastructure, dozens of 
bridges and nearly 1,000 km of roads have been reconstructed and rehabilitated, 
allowing thousands to return to their homes and reach markets to trade their goods. 
Although more than a million Angolans still require food aid, almost half a million 
more hectares of land were cultivated. By the end of 2004, the internally displaced 
persons (IDP) return process will be officially complete – meaning that that nearly 4 
million people would have returned to their areas of origin, two and half years after the 
end of the conflict, which is a truly remarkable achievement.1  
 
In spite of all these signs of progress, the overall picture of socio -economic development 
levels is dismal.According to the 2004 World Human Development Report, Angola 
ranks 166th among 177 countries in terms of the Human Development Index, which 
aggregates a wide range of socio -economic indicators. A peculiarity of the Angolan 
situation is the discrepancy between its HDI ranking and its GDP per capita ranking, 
the former being 38 places lower than the latter. In other words, Angola is not only 
doing poorly in terms of comprehensive socio-economic development but it is doing 
worse than its wealth would suggest. This discrepancy is typical of oil-based economies 
                                                 
1 Based the United Nations Integrated Region Information Networks reporting on a statement by the 
Acting UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator at the quarterly meeting of the Humanitarian 
Coordination Group, 23 September 2004 (http://allafrica.com/stories/200409230870.html) 
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– but the case of Angola is special, however, because countries scoring this low on the 
Human Development Index scale are usually not oil economies and have per capita 
incomes less than half that of Angola.  
 
In spite of the reorientation towards a market economy undertaken over a decade ago, 
Angola remains an inhospitable environment for businesses. The recently released 
World Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 (World Economic Forum, 2004) ranks 
Angola 103rd out of 104 nations in terms of their so-called Growth Competitiveness 
Index – an indicator that combines information on the quality of the national 
macroeconomic environment, state of public institutions, and technological readiness. 
Only Chad ranked lower than Angola. And Angola ranked last in terms of the 
complementary and more specific Business Competitiveness Index, which evaluates the 
sophistication of the operating practices and strategies of companies, and the quality of 
the micro-economic business environment in which a nation’s companies compete.  
 
The Government presented in late October 2004 its proposed State budget for 2005.  
The key target indicators are as follows: 
 
· 15% inflation for the year; 
· annual oil production: 441.5 million barrels; 
· average export price of crude oil: US$ 26.50 per barrel; 
· rate of growth of Gross Domestic product at market prices: 16.1 per cent (21.4 
per cent for the oil sector and 10.4 per cent for the non-oil sector) 
· Gross Domestic Product at current prices: Kz 1,874 billion (roughly US$ 1,600 
per capita, at current exchange rates, not adjusted for purchasing power)   
 
Fiscal revenue is projected to attain some Kz 638 billion, of which two thirds will be oil 
related. Government spending is targeted at about Kz 806 billion, resulting in a budget 
deficit of about 9 per cent of the GDP. This implies an increase of the budget deficit by 
3.6 per cent in relation to 2004, which is due to a decline in the effective taxation rate 
of the oil sector, from 27.4 per cent to 22.7 per cent of the GDP and an increase of 
capital expenditure from 5.8 per cent to 13.0 per cent of the GDP.   
 
However, to contain the deficit growth, it is envisaged that current expenditure will 
decline from 36.2 of the GDP to 30.0 per cent, as a consequence of a reduction of 
government spending on goods and services from 14.5 per cent of the GDP to 10.0 per 
cent, as well as a reduction of spending on subsidies from 4.5 per cent of the GDP to 
1.1 per cent. 
 
In order to finance the deficit, the Government envisages to use some US$ 600 million 
of treasury reserves accumulated as a result of the high oil prices in 2004. 
 
The functional distribution of expenditure in the 2005 budget is as follows: 
- Administration: 23.0 per cent, 7 percentage points less than the projected figure 
for 2004; 
- Defence and public order: 17.9 per cent, an increase of 5 ,4 percentage points; 
- Social Sector: 23.0 per cent, an increase of  2.9 percentage points 
- Productive Sector:  14.8 per cent, an increase of 9.1 percentage points; 
- Debt service: 21.3 per cent, a reduction of 10.4 percentage points. 
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The threat of AIDS 
In the medium to long term, a major challenge to Angola’s socio-economic 
development prospects may come from the spread of AIDS.  
 
At the end of 2003, UNAIDS estimated that Angola had some 240,000 persons living 
with HIV, although the high end of the estimation would put the figure at 600,000 
(UNAIDS 2004). The estimated HIV infection rate for Angola thus remains under 10 
percent for non-elderly adults, less than half of the rate in neighbouring Congo or 
Zambia, and about one-fourth the rate in Botswana. Decades of warfare trapped 
Angola in what has been described as a kind of medical time warp: borders were 
closed; civilians moved cautiously or not at all; and the disease that has ravaged this 
continent more than any other largely bypassed Angola, rates of HIV infection being 
especially low in the interior provinces such as Huambo, where the fighting was most 
intense. The danger is now that peace, combined with the social dislocation, poor 
health and low education levels created by war, have put the country on the path to 
reach the infection rates of its neighbours in just a few years. Adding to the danger are 
the opening of new trucking lanes and the surge of hundreds of thousands of refugees 
returning from camps in countries with far higher HIV rates. In addition, soldiers from 
both sides of the conflict are resettling across Angola, and bringing infection to areas 
where previously it was rare. Sudden jumps in infection rates have been recorded in 
Luanda, the capital, among prostitutes and pregnant women. Young adults and teens 
are considered among the most vulnerable and the most likely to spread HIV to others 
and in Angola, an estimated 70 per cent of the population is under 25. 
 
A nationwide survey of HIV/AIDS prevalence is currently under way; its results are 
expected to be available in late December 2004, but the Ministry of Health has 
indicated that it expects the study to show a sharp rise in the number of HIV infected 
persons, particularly in the coastal provinces of Luanda and Benguela, as well as in the 
province of Cunene, which borders Namibia.    
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3. Angola as a development partner 
Angolan authorities often voice disappointment that unlike other post-conflict 
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, Angola has not received a peace dividend in the 
form of the massive influx of development assistance that it would need to meet its 
rebuilding and development needs – and even the full scale of its current humanitarian 
needs.  On his return from the opening of the United Nations General Assembly 59th 
Session in September 2004, the Foreign Affairs Minister was quoted as saying that the 
international community was practicing “discrimination” and that “in identical [post-
conflict] situations, the international community has had one attitude relative to some 
countries and another in relation to Angola”.  
 
There are several reasons why Angola’s situation does not quite compare with that of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. One is obviously that Angola is not linked to a broader security 
threat to the West or its allies. Another, perhaps more importantly, is that 
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan and Iraq is being pledged it the context of a regime 
change brought about by military intervention of sections of the donor community: it is 
something that they “own”, willing or not, and for which they will hopefully feel a 
long term commitment and financial responsibility. That was not the case in Angola. 
While the international community may collectively rejoice with the end of the Angola 
civil war, the outcome of the war – a military victory for MPLA – did not bring the 
regime change. Of course, the commonly accepted notion that Angola is a rich country 
that should not need aid also makes it all the easier to hold back official development 
assistance.    
 
The flows of official development assistance (ODA) have thus been very limited, as 
shown in table 3.1. 
     
Table 3.1: Angola: Flow of official development assistance (ODA), most recent data 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total net ODA 306.67 288.59 421.37 498.74 
¹ Preliminary figures; in millions of US dollars  
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Destination of Official Development Assistance and 
Official Aid, Disbursements (Table 2A). Online database at http://www.oecd.org 
 
Although the United States are the most important bilateral source of ODA, most of 
Angola’s ODA comes in fact from Europe, either through the European Commission or 
through bilateral aid programmes. But the level of bilateral commitments is very low, 
as shown in table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Ten top donors of gross ODA 
  2001-2002 average 
(million US$) 
 1-United States 71 
 2-European Commission 62 
 3-Netherlands 24 
 4-Japan 24 
 5-Norway 20 
 6-IDA 16 
 7-Sweden 14 
 8-Germany 13 
 9-Portugal 13 
10-Spain 12 
Source: See table 3.1 
 
 
These flows are quite small compared to direct foreign investment (FDI). As shown in 
table 3.3 Angola regularly attracts 10-15 per cent of all FDI to Africa and is thus one of 
the top destinations for FDI going to Africa, currently competing with Equatorial 
Guinea, another oil economy, for first place in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Foreign direct investment (inward flows), Angola and some comparators 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Angola 879 2,146 1,643 1,415 
Nigeria 930 1,104 1,281 1,200 
South Africa 888 6,789 757 762 
Africa 8,728 19,616 11,780 15,033 
Millions of US dollars  
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Development Report 
2004. Country fact sheet: Angola. (online at http://www.unctad.org). 
 
 
Angola’s position as an FDI destination is expected to be considerably strengthened in 
the coming years. Chevron-Texaco, the largest oil producer in Angola, recently 
announced that it planned to invest USD 11 billion in its operations in Angola during 
2003-2008. 
 
These flows, however, do very little to alleviate poverty, because they are directed 
towards the infrastructure of the oil industry, and have very little multiplier effect. The 
Government would need much greater amounts of aid and investment if it were to meet 
its humanitarian and development objectives. A preliminary costing exercise recently 
reported by the media indicated that the first phase of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
programme would require USD 3 billion up to 2007.  
 
Moreover, Angola’s balance of payments has in most years been hugely negative, 
because the recorded incomes from oil and diamond exports are much smaller than the 
combined costs of debts servicing, imported goods and services, profit repatriation and 
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other transactions. If the full extent of capital flight attributable to illicit transactions 
was taken into account, the picture would look even worse.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Current-account balance (millions US$) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 
- 1,711 796 -1,431 -644 -610 600 
* Sources: Up to 2003, Economist Intelligence Unit Estimates; **IMF visiting team estimates. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit (2004), p. 5 and IMF (2004) 
 
 
Ever since its victory over UNITA in 2002, the Government has been calling for a 
Donors’ Conference. Such a Conference would provide not only a useful amount of 
fresh money, but also a vote of confidence from the international community for the 
Government. The need for this vote of confidence appears all the more pressing now 
that MPLA is approaching nation wide elections and would need to convince voters 
that it can deliver on the provision of basic social services. 
 
Donors have been using this resource crunch as an opportunity to achieve a number of 
development policy objectives. While expressing sympathy for the idea of a donors’ 
conference (Belgium, for instance, offered to host it, like they did in 1995 in the wake 
of the Lusaka Agreements), and recognizing the need for it, they have also advised the 
Government that a prerequisite for a successful donors’ conference is the support of the 
Bretton Woods institutions. These in turn have insisted on a number of conditions: the 
IMF would again attempt to establish a “Staff Monitored Programme” (SMP) – 
although the two previous attempts have failed for insufficient Government 
cooperation with regard to the transparency of public finances. Donors have also 
rallied behind the Bretton Woods institutions’ requirement that the Angolan authorities 
commit to a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), that would provide the 
foundation for the country’s development policies, including ODA-related priorities. 
 
For most donors, it is important that this Bretton Woods package (Staff Monitored 
Programme and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) be pursued as a whole, because, on 
the one hand, the macro-economic balances which are of greatest concern to IMF do 
not necessarily result in socially responsible policies while, on the other hand, viable 
poverty reduction policies need a sound and sustainable financial foundation.         
 
An IMF staff mission visited Angola in July 2004 for so-called “article IV annual 
consultations” and they issued a communiqué which was encouraging in tone, but 
firmly underscored that much remains to be done before a Staff Monitored Programme 
can be started. Since such communiqués are carefully worded and in this case closely 
read by the donor community for any ODA-relevant guidance, it may be useful to 
quote it a some length here:   
 
“Significant progress has been made towards macroeconomic stability over the last year, 
although the policy mechanisms adopted have resulted in some distortions to the domestic 
economy. The 12-month rate of inflation has declined to below 50 percent and the rate of 
depreciation of the kwanza exchange rate has slowed markedly. However, external debt levels 
have continued to rise in dollar terms, international reserves are low, and the potential cost 
competitiveness of Angola goods has been reduced. 
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(…) 
 
"Recent improvements in transparency, particularly regarding oil revenues, external debt, and 
transactions involving Sonangol, resulted in some commendable clarification of the 
government's overall fiscal position in 2003, but major deficiencies remain in fiscal information. 
Weak monitoring and control of public expenditure is inhibiting assessment of the current fiscal 
position. 
 
"Reliance on expensive oil-backed loans from commercial banks has burdened the economy 
with heavy debt servicing commitments and Angola's external position will continue to be very 
difficult for the remainder of this decade. 
 
"To address Angola's pressing social and infrastructure needs, very high rates of GDP growth 
will be needed for a sustained period. This will require macroeconomic stability. One possible 
policy scenario discussed by the mission envisaged a rapid reduction in inflation to single-digit 
levels, based on improved fiscal control, together with resolute action by the central government 
and the central bank to control liquidity through the management and issue of domestic debt.  
 
(…) 
 
"To direct additional resources to urgent social priorities, reductions will be needed in other 
spending commitments, notably the very large payrolls of both the civilian and military sectors 
and continuing subsidies to consumers. These can be achieved through measures to eliminate 
`ghost workers', cut numbers of personnel, and bring energy and water prices this year into line 
with costs. 
 
"The achievement of high rates of economic growth also requires a conducive business and 
investment environment. This requires that firm measures are taken to ensure that regulations, 
property rights and contracts are transparent and uniformly enforced; and to limit corruption 
and anti-competitive privileges.  
 
"Noting progress in the provision of essential information, and in the expectation that further 
important data on recent fiscal transactions and oil-related production costs will be made 
available, the mission looked forward to commencing detailed discussions within the next few 
months on a clear specification of policy objectives for the Angolan economy, in the context of 
preparation for the 2005 budget, which could form the basis for consideration of a staff-
monitored program." 
 
While the relationship between the IMF and the Government is warming up, it is clear 
that the IMF is proceeding cautiously and that there is a gap in the perceptions and 
expectations held at both ends. The Government is keen to project great optimism on 
having not only a Staff Monitored Programme, but actual lending by 2005. In October 
2004, much was being made in the Angolan official media of the impending 2-day visit 
to Angola by Takatoshi Kato, one of the IMF’s three Deputy Managing Directors. The 
Government hopes that Angola would benefit from the so-called “Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility” (PRGF), the IMF’s low-interest lending mechanism for low-
income countries. However, the IMF requires that a PRGF programme, if applicable, 
be framed around a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), from which the targets 
and policy conditions of the PRGF programme could be directly derived. With regard 
to Kato’s visit, the IMF’s spokesman in Washington pointedly noted that it should not 
be construed as programme related and that Kato, a recent appointee to the IMF with 
Angola in his regional portfolio, was simply taking the opportunity of a trip to the 
region to familiarize himself with the country.  
 
The IMF has reasons to be cautious. Not only has Angola a previous history of failed 
Staff Monitored Programmes, but the nature of its regime and its political institutions 
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suggests that it could again walk away from such commitments if the Presidency were 
to conclude that the Programme’s requirements, either with regard to transparency or 
to public subsidies, were too costly politically.   
 
Regarding the Poverty Reduction Strategy process, the Government, assisted by UNDP, 
devised an interim strategy known by its Portuguese acronym ECP (Estratégia de 
combate à pobreza) that could serve as a guiding document until a Donors’ Conference 
produces the ODA necessary to implement a full-fledged and longer-term PRS. The 
ECP was approved by the cabinet in February 2004, but it has not been discussed by 
the parliament, nor officially submitted to the Bretton Woods institutions. According to 
the World Bank, “when the Interim PRSP is presented by the Government to the 
Executive Board of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it will 
be accompanied by an assessment of the strategy by Bank and Fund staff – the Joint 
Staff Assessment (JSA)” – suggesting that the process is still far from complete. 
 
Critics of the PRS processes point out that these documents tend to be essentially for 
external consumption (i.e., to satisfy donors’ requirements) and that unless they are 
linked to the Governmental budget processes they will have little impact on actual 
policy making. However, it is important that Angola is finally developing its economic 
planning capacity. In all the years since independence, Angola has been able to produce 
only one 5-year plan, in the early 1980s: the experience was so disastrous that it was 
never tried again. Ironically, modern macro-economic management in the context of an 
open, market-oriented economy is likely to require more sophisticated planning than 
the nominal “centrally planned economy” of wartime ever did.     
The Millennium Development Goals 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the eight development priorities at 
the core of the Millennium Declaration, a global development agenda agreed upon by 
91 heads of state and 189 member nations at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. The 
goals are operationalised in terms of quantitative targets, which are 18 in total (see 
Annex 3). The United Nations system and most bilateral donors, among others, are 
using the MDGs as the main framework for their development cooperation 
programmes.   
 
The Angolan authorities have formally embraced the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and are integrating them in their medium and long-term planning exercises – 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation programme. With assistance from UNDP, the Ministry of Planning 
released in 2004 a study about the status of the MDGs in Angola, providing for each of 
the goals (1) an assessment of status and trends; (2) the challenges in meeting the goal; 
(3) existing policies and programmes addressing the goal; (4) assistance priorities and 
(5) capacity for monitoring of progress – this latter looking specifically into a set of six 
indicators: issues of  data collection capacity;  quality of the recent data; capacity for 
statistical monitoring; capacity for statistical analysis, capacity to incorporate statistical 
analyses in policies, plans and resource allocation mechanisms; and mechanisms for 
monitoring and evaluation (Agências das Nações Unidas 2003). The study provides a 
sobering overview of the socio-economic conditions in Angola, although much of the 
data are outdated or represent little substantiated estimates.  
  12 
 
Table 3.5: Will the goals/targets be met? 
Goals/targets (nr.) Probably Potentially No No data 
Extreme poverty (1)  v   
Hunger (2)  v   
Universal primary education (3)   v  
Gender equality (4)   v  
Child mortality (5)   v  
Maternal mortality (6)   v  
HIV/AIDS (7)    v 
Stop/revert Malaria (8)   v  
Stop/revert Tuberculosis (8)   v  
Stop/revert trypanosomiasis (8)    v 
Reverse loss of natural resources (9)  v   
Access to safe drinking water (10)   v  
Improvement of quality of life (11)   v  
Source: adapted from Agências das Nações Unidas (2003), p. 68. 
 
 
The chances of achieving the goals for 13 key targets were assessed by the study as 
shown in table 3.5. None of the selected key targets were found likely to be achieved, 
and only three out 11 were thought to be “potentially” achievable. Most of the others 
were rated “not achievable” and in two instances, there was simply no data.  
 
Obviously, one of the main benefits of an exercise of this kind is to force planners to 
think systematically and make the necessary connections between means and 
objectives, including monitoring mechanisms. The detailed attention that was given in 
this study to the assessment of the country’s capacity for statistical and analytical 
monitoring seems truly exemplary, although the emerging picture is far from uplifting.    
The Falcone affair and its implications 
The Falcone affair, often called “Angolagate”, has further damaged the image of the 
Angola regime during the last few years, and had some notable developments in 2004, 
which are illustrative of the nature of the regime and the difficulty of its relations with 
the international community. 
 
As the reader will recall, Pierre Falcone is an Algeria-born French businessman with 
multiple nationalities and residences. In late 1993 and early 1994, Falcone and Arcadi 
Gaydamak, a Russian businessman based in Israel, helped arrange the sale to Angola of 
over US$ 600 million worth of weapons, including tanks and helicopters, supplied by a 
Slovakian company that procured the weapons from Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine. 
Thanks to their sensitive role in Angola, Falcone and Gaydamak are alleged to have 
befriended the President and the two men are reported to have been given not only 
Angolan citizenship, but also a stake in virtually every key sector of the Angolan 
economy, from food to diamonds to oil. In 1999, the Angolan government picked 
Falcon Oil Holdings, a Falcone-owned firm registered in Panama, as a minority partner 
to ExxonMobil on a huge offshore site. 
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Falcone’s dealings with Angola became the interest of the French judiciary system, 
because of it being part of a wider corruption and money laundering scandal with far 
reaching ramifications into the world of French politics. Falcone was initially charged 
with “illegal arms trading, fiscal fraud, misuse of social benefits, abuse of trust and 
influence peddling” (Global Witness 2002, p 26)  and placed in provisional detention 
for one year – until a major part of the case collapsed on a technicality and the 
authorities decided to release him on a US$ 15 million bail (later reduced to one third 
of that sum on appeal). When he was arrested in December 2000, he had exhibited an 
Angolan diplomatic passport. His line of defence during his detention was that he was 
a diplomat. President dos Santos is said to have written several times to the French 
authorities to confirm that Falcone was mandated by him and that Falcone could not 
testify because of the need to protect the “superior interests of the Angolan nation”; it 
is also understood that it was Sonangol that posted the bail on his behalf. After his 
release in December 2001 he was placed surveillance and barred from leaving the 
French territory. In September 2003, however, President dos Santos appointed him as 
counsellor of the Angolan delegation to UNESCO in Paris; shortly after his 
appointment, he left France for a visit to Angola and continued to travel widely – under 
the protection of his diplomatic status. 
 
When the French authorities indicated that their judiciary was not inclined to recognize 
Falcone’s diplomatic immunity, the Angolan Government responded on two fronts: on 
the diplomatic front, it put the Franco-Angolan relations in a limbo, by delaying the 
acceptance of the credentials of the new French Ambassador – who was left unable to 
exercise his official functions for about six months. On the economic front, the 
Government instructed Sonangol to indicate to Total, the French oil company involved 
in the exploration of various oil fields in Angola, that its contracts were in jeopardy 
and that the contract for sub-block 3/30, which was about to expire, would not be 
renewed.  
 
The flexing of the oil muscle for political purposes is a new development in Angola. 
The MPLA regime has previously indicated its willingness to protect Angola’s 
commercial relations, even in the face of the gravest political difficulties – as was the 
case with the US oil interests in the era before the first Clinton administration.  
The United States 
Political relations (as distinct from commercial relations) between Luanda and 
Washington have not always been good: the United States provided both overt and 
covert support to MPLA’s adversaries since even before independence and did not 
recognize the Government of Angola until the first Clinton administration in 1993. 
Yet, Angola has been a loyal commercial partner for American oil companies, even – in 
an often noted twist of events typical of the cold war - detaching Cuban soldiers to 
protect US oil installations from US backed rebels. Today, Chevron Texaco remains the 
main operator in Angola’s oil industry, with an extensive, high-profile presence in 
Luanda. Angola is the United States’ eight largest supplier of oil, with a share of about 
8 per cent of US oil imports; this share that is expected to continue growing as the US 
seeks to diversify its sources away from the Middle-East and in particular to increase 
the share of its imports from Sub-Saharan Africa from the current 15 per cent to 25 per 
cent over the next 10 years.  
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The relationship with the United States is currently at its best ever, as illustrated by the 
visit of José Eduardo dos Santos to President Bush in the White House in May 2004.  
There have also been contacts at the military level, including a visit by the U.S. Military 
Commander for Europe. It was rumoured that the US was interested in establishing a 
military outpost in Angola, but this was officially denied. However, the US offered to 
train Angolan officers at military facilities in the US. Since language courses were 
specifically mentioned, the signal is that this is still a tentative, low key relationship – 
but a politically significant step nevertheless.  
 
USAID’s assistance is governed by a programming document drawn up in 2000, the 
USAID/Angola Strategic Plan 2001-2005 – which has recently been extended for one 
further year – supplemented by annual Budget Justifications presented to the US 
Congress. USAID describes the US national interests in Angola as socio -economic, 
humanitarian, and political, with assistance being directed towards “economic 
rehabilitation, effective national reconciliation, resettlement and reintegration of war-
affected populations, reconstruction of crucial infrastructure, and the establishment of 
democratic and free market economic processes” (USAID 2004). Under the so-called 
“democracy objective”, funds are currently earmarked for activities “to support and 
strengthen civil society coalitions, promote independent media, encourage transparent 
and accountable governance, secure land tenure rights, ensure free and fair electoral 
processes, and mitigate community level conflicts”. The agency notes that the coalitions 
that it supports have lobbied government institutions, raised awareness among citizens, 
influenced the Government (…) to respond to citizens’ concerns, and contributed to 
UNITA's successful transformation from an armed movement to a viable political 
party”. USAID is currently looking to expand its activities in the media sector, 
specifically in the area radio broadcasting, “to increase the dissemination of objective, 
timely information”.   
 
Both the US Democratic and Republican parties maintain USAID-funded listening posts 
in Luanda, through their international research organisations – the National 
Democratic Institute (NDA) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), whose 
local offices work closely together. Their aim is to promote multiparty democracy in 
Angola. Another prominent organisation is the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which has 
links to the German Social-Democratic Party. One particularly valuable initiative of the 
IRI is the survey of political attitudes and perceptions among the population - the first 
ever such study in Angola – which is discussed at length in the next chapter.       
 
2004 saw the arrival of a new US Ambassador to Angola, Ms. Cynthia Efird, whose 
last prior position was as director of Diplomacy and Public Relations in the Bureau of 
African Affairs of the US Department of State. Both the Angolan Ambassador and a 
delegation from UNITA were guests of the Democratic Convention in Boston, the latter 
invited courtesy of USAID, their trip being facilitated by the National Democratic 
Institute’s office in Luanda. 
The United Nations 
The United Nations’ position was greatly weakened by its inability to ensure UNITA’s 
compliance with the successive peace agreements, and in particular UNITA’s flaunting 
of the arms embargo imposed by Security Council resolution 833 (1993). The 
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withdrawal of the UN Observer Mission (MONUA) in February 1999 marked the end 
of the UN’s role as peace-broker in Angola. 
 
The United Nations system continues to play a very important humanitarian and 
development-related role in Angola – although it is no longer the lifeline to the 
international community that it was in the days prior to the Bicesse agreements or at 
the height of the emergency in 2002, when the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs had to cope with more than two million people 
barely surviving and at least three million receiving humanitarian assistance.  The acute 
phase of the emergency was declared over in July 2003, and the Office shut down in 
early 2004, after transferring the remaining functions to the Government authorities 
and United Nations agencies responsible for humanitarian and transition activities. 
 
The last Consolidated Appeals Process document prepared by OCHA for 2004 
contains a strategic roadmap for the years ahead, as the focus moves from relief and 
recovery in the short term, to recovery and development in the longer term: 
 
The main goal for relief and recovery partners in 2004 is to work in partnership with the 
government to address remaining emergency needs while working to contribute to quickly 
upscale and progressively upgrade basic social services in resettlement and return areas, 
strengthen institutional capacity, and improve legal frameworks and procedures for basic 
social services delivery. 
 
The strategic goal for recovery and development partners during the next two to five years 
is to assist in the creation of an enabling environment for the consolidation of peace, 
national reconciliation, the promotion of social justice and equitable distribution of 
resources, full civic participation by supporting the respect for human rights, national 
poverty reduction efforts, sound economic management and diversification, achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the empowerment of all Angolans in the 
development process (UNDAF main goal). 
 
The strategic goal for development partners during the next five to ten years is the gradual 
attainment of the Millennium Goals and targets adopted in 2000 by the UN member states, 
including the Government of Angola, during the Millennium Summit, and the fulfilment of 
the core social, economic, political and cultural rights expressed in Angolan law. (UN 
OCHA 2004). 
 
The UN presence in the country is led by the Resident Representative of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who is also Resident Coordinator of the 
United Nations System and United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.  
 
The assistance provided by the United Nations System in the coming years will be 
governed by a document called United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) 2005-2008, drawn up in alignment with the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper and the Millennium Development Goals. The broad priority areas will be basic 
social services, sustainable livelihoods and decentralization/governance issues.  
 
One of the main functions of UNDP is to coordinate donors vis à vis the Government – 
through the Angolan Ministry of Planning, which acts as counterpart for international 
development cooperation.  UNDP officially is satisfied with the level of coordination 
among donors, which is greater than in many countries. Some donors however consider 
it insufficient, blaming it in part on the shortcomings of the Ministry of Planning, 
which is short on staff and vision. Critics hope that  the Ministry of Planning and the 
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Ministry of Finance will eventually merge, which will give donors a technically 
stronger, and politically a more forward-looking and responsive counterpart.  
 
UNDP was the focal point for international assistance to the 1992 electoral process, 
drawing on its own technical resources and those of the Department of Political Affairs 
in the United Nations Secretariat and also channelling part of the assistance provided 
by bi-lateral donors. Key aspects of UNDP’s role were the coordination of international 
assistance and the logistics of the electoral process, which were worked out with the 
national counterpart, the Ministry of Territorial Administration.  It is likely that UNDP 
will again be called upon to provide crucial assistance for the upcoming elections. For 
the 1992 elections, UNDP was the convenor of an informal donors’ coordination 
arrangement, the International Elections Working Group – an entity which might 
usefully be revived and expanded in view of the upcoming elections.  
 
Another UN agency that has played, and continues to play, a crucial role is the World 
Food Programme, which continues to distribute some 10,000 metric tons of emergency 
food to an estimated population of more than one million beneficiaries. WFP assistance 
has been going on for so long that sections of the Angolan bureaucracy seem to have 
lost sight of its humanitarian nature. The media recently reported that ENANA, the 
national airport operator, demanded that WPF paid all airport taxes, including 
navigation, landing, passenger and parking fees for its flights. It was also reported that 
tonnes of food were recently stuck for months in Luanda's port, waiting for the 
government to pay customs and port taxes, until the dispute was eventually resolved 
among the Government agencies concerned.     
The European Union 
The EU agreed on a common position towards Angola in 2002 (2002/495/CFSP). This 
provided the foundation for the EC/Angola Strategy for 2002-2007, signed with the 
Government in January 2003. The Council of the Union reviewed the matter in 
October 2003 and adopted a set of objectives and guidelines for the Union’s 
engagement with Angola; these were reaffirmed and extended for another year at the 
recent Council of Ministers Meeting in October 2004. It may be useful to recall here 
the contents of that document, since it frames in a very detailed and explicit way the 
scope and conditions for development cooperation between Angola and its most 
influent group of donors: 
 
“The European Union will pursue the following objectives with regard to Angola: 
(…) 
- support the process of national reconciliation and democracy, through the promotion of 
good governance and a culture of tolerance among all political parties and all sectors of 
civil society (…) 
- taking note of the steps already taken in this regard, encourage the Government of Angola 
and all the political forces to hold free and fair general elections as soon as possible once 
conditions are met, to accelerate the constitutional reform process, fully to respect the rule 
of law and justice throughout Angolan territory, to promote and protect human rights and 
to foster the role of civil society in contributing to national reconciliation and democracy 
building in the country; 
- encourage the Government of Angola to intensify its efforts to relieve the serious 
humanitarian situation and favour actions of mine-clearance, social reintegration and 
resettlement of all the internally displaced people, refugees and former soldiers, including 
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child soldiers, (…) and to create the conditions to allow the international community to 
complement these efforts; 
- to encourage the Government: 
(i) to implement transparent management of public resources and full accountability for the 
benefit of all Angolans, thus laying the ground for sustainable economic and social 
development; 
(ii) to support the pursuit of sound poverty-oriented macroeconomic policies so as to ensure 
better prospects for poverty reduction, economic growth and sustainable development for 
the country; 
(iii) to increase its efforts and budgetary resources to the health, education and agricultural 
development sectors; 
(iv) to conclude an agreement with the IMF; 
(v) to complete the necessary preparatory work to ensure a successful outcome of the 
donors’ conference on the reconstruction of the country; 
(vi) to agree on a comprehensive plan with the aim of reducing poverty; 
- encourage co-operation and understanding among the countries in the region with the aim 
of improving regional security and economic development. 
 
In order to further the above mentioned objectives, the European Union will: 
- conduct a regular political dialogue with the Angolan authorities as envisaged in the 
Continuo Agreement; 
- offer to assist efforts by the Government of Angola to strengthen democratic institutions 
and practices so as to allow the holding of free and fair legislative and presidential elections 
and to ensure respect for human rights, the rule of law and independent civil society; 
- offer to assist efforts by the Government of Angola to accelerate the constitutional reform 
and will provide assistance to develop a pluralistic democracy based on institutional 
strengthening of the parliamentary process and a multi-party system as well as capacity 
building to foster a dynamic, participatory civil society; 
- offer to assist efforts by the Government of Angola to reinforce overall administrative 
capacity, creating a coherent and functional country -wide administration and market 
oriented policies, and to strengthen capacities in the legal and judicial system; 
- offer to assist efforts by the Government to reform the Angolan economy through 
cooperation with the IMF in co-ordination with the international community, to help the 
Government in its fight against corruption and poverty; encourage and assist the 
Government of Angola in its efforts to prepare a poverty reduction and growth facility 
programme and to reinforce its dialogue with the IMF; 
- reiterate its solidarity with, and commitment to the Angolan people, by continuing to 
contribute to the efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and alleviate the suffering of 
the most vulnerable groups among the Angolan population, without prior categorisation, 
inter alia, by encouraging the Commission of the European Communities to take all 
measures rapidly to implement all available funding in support of the peace process in 
coordination with the United Nations and the international financial institutions, the Union 
will continue to 
-assist the Government of Angola in addressing the humanitarian situation and needs 
arising from demobilisation and reintegration programmes which are necessary for a full-
scale reconstruction of the country. The Union urges the Government to make rapidly an 
accurate evaluation of the most pressing needs of the Angolan population; 
- offer to assist the Government of Angola to intensify its efforts to tackle transmissible 
diseases, and in particular to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS; 
- offer to assist the Government of Angola in the rebuilding and reconstruction of the 
country, encouraging its intention to convene an international donors’ conference with EU 
support and paying due regard to the rules of transparency and accountability within a 
democratic environment, while inviting it to allocate the resources necessary to implement 
economic and social policies that will improve the lives of the citizens of Angola as part of 
the peace dividend; 
- be prepared to participate in mine-clearance operations (…)."2 
                                                 
2 Minutes of the 2532nd Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 13 October 2003, doc. 13098/03 online at  
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/77596.pdf 
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Although Portugal is a member of the European Union, and therefore has to abide by 
the Union’s common policy directives, its status as the former colonial power sets it 
apart from its partners in the Union. It is in many respects the most influential partner 
in the international community – because of the language, the shared culture of their 
elites, the institutional memory and also the continued bonds of commercial interest 
(Portugal supplies about one fifth of Angola’s imports, more than any other country). 
Families may have members in both countries, individuals may have both nationalities 
and not only the elite but also the middle class travel back and forth. All this gives 
Portugal a privileged level of access to Angola’s political and economic centres of 
decision, and lucrative opportunities for Portuguese businesses – well beyond the US$ 
10-15 million that it provides annually as bilateral official development assistance. To 
what extent Portugal is willing and able to use its influence to consistently promote 
democracy and the rule of law in Angola is something that the Portuguese authorities 
are reluctant to discuss with third parties.  European Union partners privately complain 
that these privileged relationships are sometimes leveraged in ways that are not 
necessarily in line with the interests and objectives of the Union.  Portugal does not 
belong to the Paris Club for the treatment of Angola debt and therefore it was able to 
conclude in August 2004 separate negotiations for the settlement of its claims, 
amounting to some US$ 800 million. 
The emergence of “no-questions asked” partners 
In the face of the considerable amount of conditionality involved in the Western 
donors’ relations with Angola, it is important to note the increased interest of rapidly 
industrialising developing countries in Angola as a source of oil. Competition is fierce 
and deals are often sweetened with financial arrangements, such as concessional loans 
for development projects. These bilateral relations are particularly valuable because 
they are essentially “no-questions asked” trading arrangements, although the aid 
component may be tied to goods and services from the lending country. In 2003, China 
granted Angola a US$ 2 billion oil-backed credit line – precisely at a time when 
Western donors, and the IMF in particular, were becoming increasingly critical of such 
arrangements because of their lack of transparency, their vulnerability to graft and 
corruption and ultimately their cost.  
 
Analysts believe that this loan, coming in a time of difficult liquidity situation for the 
Government, subsequently put China in good position to win the allocation of a 50 per 
cent stake in offshore Block 18, which is expected to start production in early 2007, 
with a target production rate of 250,000 barrels per day. The stake was previously held 
by Shell, which had in fact already reached an agreement with an Indian company for 
its sale for US$ 600 million, when the Government instructed Sonangol to exercise its 
preemption rights. Subsequently, the Chinese state-owned media reported that 
Sonangol sold the stake to China, explaining that “China had managed to swing the 
deal by offering aid to the tune of $2 billion for a variety of projects to Angola, 
compared to India's offer of $200 million for developing railways” (International Oil 
Daily, 22 October 2004). 
 
At the time of writing, the Indian Government reportedly had not given up on its hopes 
to secure the oil stake for the Indian company and was working out a "customized" 
political and economic package for Angola that could sweeten the deal and outbid 
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China's offer. The Angolan Government was apparently sending mixed signals, 
sometimes saying that it might consider India’s offer and in other occasions that India 
should forget about that particular deal and wait for other opportunities.  
Towards greater transparency 
A crucial aspect of the reformists’ agenda is to ensure that Angola lives up to its 
agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly with respect to so-called 
transparency issues. The IMF has imposed as a condition for its support that Angola 
opens its books, so that the true situation of the country’s public finances may be 
known.  
An important step in this direction was the publication in March 2004 of a study called 
“Diagnostic of the Oil Industry”.3 The study was commissioned in November 2000 by 
the National Bank of Angola (then headed by Aguinaldo Jaime) acting on behalf of the 
Ministry of Finance and with support from the IMF and the World Bank. The exercise 
was meant to promote transparency from the start: the contract for the study went to 
KPMG, chosen on the basis of an international tender, and the terms of reference for 
the study were made public six months later, in June 2001. 
 
The aim of the project was to conduct a broad study of relationship between the 
petroleum sector and the public finances of the country, to assist the Government to 
increase transparency in the flows of revenues from petroleum production, and to build 
managerial capacity for monitoring the flows of such resources. As the authors 
emphatically pointed out, “as stipulated by the Government and the World Bank, our 
work does not amount to an audit conducted in accordance with international auditing 
standards and does not give the same level of assurance as an audit would”. The 
KPMG experts also stressed that they did not attempt to verify the accuracy or 
completeness of the data, information and documentation provided by the various 
sources for the purpose of the study. In other words, the objective was not to “name 
and shame” or even to provide an authoritative assessment of the amounts of oil 
revenue involved in illicit payments or questionable transactions, but rather to establish 
a technical basis for sound management of the oil revenues assuming that there would 
be political will to proceed in that direction. It may be noted that the report holds the 
Norwegian experience with Statoil and the Petroleum Directorate as an example of 
successful arrangements that influenced the philosophy of some of the key 
recommendations. 
 
The study contains detailed recommendations regarding arrangements in six areas: 
technical matters; legislative, regulatory and fiscal matters, revenues inflows and 
outflows; accounting arrangements; institution strengthening; managerial capacity 
enhancements and future needs. However, the authors advise that the main priority 
should be focused on just three recommendations: a review the petroleum revenue 
management legislation; the creation of a Petroleum Revenue Management Agency; 
and the transfer of the role of the Concessionaire from Sonangol to the Ministry of 
Petroleum. 
 
                                                 
3 A 30-page executive summary of the study, in Portuguese and English versions, can be downloaded 
from the site of the Angolan Ministry of Finance: http://www.minfin.gv.ao/noticia/outra032.htm 
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Although the study was more of a forward-looking and institutional development 
nature than an investigative audit, it did not fail to notice many disturbing accounting 
discrepancies and institutional arrangements that seemed to lend themselves to graft 
and corruption. 
 
The ultimate value of this exercise will depend on the extent to which the study’s 
recommendations will be acted upon,. However, the publication of the report in early 
2004 – including in electronic form – appears to be a major landmark on the road to 
governance reform in Angola. 
 
Another significant development relates to the institutional arrangements surrounding 
the US$ 2 billion loan from China for infrastructure public works: the Government not 
only set up a board of supervisors drawn from the various governmental agencies who 
have a stake in the loan and its use, but their names were also made available to the 
public, suggesting that a higher standard of transparency and accountability was being 
sought for this kind of transactions.   
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4. The political arena in Angola 
The current democratic institutions in Angola result from two sets of agreements 
concluded between MPLA and UNITA: the Angola Peace Accords (known as the 
Bicesse agreements, from the name of a village near Lisbon, where the talks were held 
in 1991) and the Lusaka Protocol of 1994. (FNLA, the third historic liberation 
movement, was militarily defeated by MPLA in 1975 and soon lost much of its 
influence; it was not involved in those agreements.) 
 
The Bicesse Agreements provided for all the freedoms and rights of a multiparty 
democracy, including, for the first time in Angola, multiparty elections. In order to 
facilitate the formation of political parties, a subsidy of US$ 50,000 and a vehicle were 
provided to those registering a new party. By 1997, when the subsidies were 
discontinued, the number of registered parties had reached 128 (see annex 1).  
 
In absence of subsequent elections, or even public opinion polls, most of what is known 
about the political landscape in Angola is based on the results of the 1992 elections. It 
may therefore be useful to recall here some of the highlights of that process. 
 
The presidential and parliamentary elections were held simultaneously on 29 and 30 
September 1992. For the presidential elections, there were 11 candidates. For the 
parliamentary elections, 18 parties presented candidates.  
 
Table 4.1: Results of the elections, 1992 
Presidential elections (1st round) Parliamentary elections 
Party* Candidate Votes % Votes % Seats 
MPLA José Eduardo dos Santos 1,953,335 49.57 2,124,126 53.74 129 
UNITA Jonas Savimbi 1,579,298 40.07 1,347,636 34.10 70 
PDA António  Alberto Neto 85,240 2.16 8,014 0.20 - 
FNLA Holden Roberto 83,135 2.11 94,742 2.40 5 
PDLA Honorato Lando 75,789 1.92 8,025 0.20 - 
PRD Luís dos Passos 59,121 1.47 35,293 0.89 1 
PSD Bengui Joäo 38,243 0.97 33,088 0.84 1 
FPD Simäo Cacete 26,385 0.67 -  - - 
Ind. Daniel Chipenda 20,646 0.52 - - - 
PLD Anália Pereira 11,475 0.29 94,269 2.39 3 
PRA Rui Pereira 9,208 0.23 6,719 0.17 - 
PRS    89,875 2.27 6 
AD    34,166 0.86 1 
PAJOCA    13,924 0.35 1 
FDA    12,038 0.30 1 
PDP-
ANA 
[Mfulumpinga Lando 
Victor]** 
  10,620 0.27 1 
PNDA    10,281 0.26 1 
CNDA    10,237 0.26 - 
PSDA [André Kilandomoko]**   19,217 0.26 - 
PAI    9,007 0.23 - 
Total  3,941,875  3,961,277  220 
* For full names of the parties, see Annex 1.  
**Candidates who were approved but subsequently withdrew, pledging support for Jonas Savimbi.  
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As shown in table 4.1, MPLA and UNITA dominated the contest on both elections, 
capturing together close to 90 per cent of the vote and relegating the other parties to an 
almost insignificant role. Some analysts believe that the concentration of the vote on 
the two main parties would have been even larger, had it not been for a flaw in the 
design of the presidential ballot (leading to thousands of votes for José Eduardo dos 
Santos to be counted as votes for António Alberto Neto or Honorato Lando) and for a 
number of illiterate UNITA supporters erroneously selecting PLD on the parliamentary 
ballot, thinking that UNITA candidates occupied the same position in both ballots. 
This analysis is supported by the comparison of the performance of each party (see 
table 4.1 above) in both elections. 
 
Two features of the election results are particularly noteworthy. One is the poor 
performance of Holden Roberto, and his party the FNLA. Their ethnic power base, the 
Bakongo, is thought to represent some 10 to 15 per cent of the population – yet they 
received less than 3 per cent of the vote. The other important result is the relative 
success of the PRS, whose ethnic power base in among the Chokwe, who predominate 
in the Lunda North and Lunda Sul provinces of Northeast Angola. Thanks to the rules 
of composition of the Parliament, PRS was able to elect 6 MPs and thus emerge as the 
third largest party in Parliament, although it had got slightly fewer votes than FNLA 
and PLD. 
 
The 1991 Constitutional law provides for 90 of the 220 seats in Parliament to be 
allocated to representatives of the Provinces, on a uniform basis of 5 seats for each 
province, irrespective of population size. The distribution of those seats, which 
constitute the so-called Provincial Circle, gives some indication of the regional/ethnic 
political power bases. 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Members of Parliament elected by the provincial circles, by 
party of affiliation 
Province MPLA UNITA PRS FNLA 
Benguela 2 3 - - 
Bengo 4 1 - - 
Bié - 5 - - 
Cabinda 4 1 - - 
Huambo 1 4 - - 
Huíla 4 1 - - 
Kuando-Kubango 1 4 - - 
Kuanza-Sul 4 1 - - 
Kuanza-Norte 5 - - - 
Kunene 5 - - - 
Luanda 4 1 - - 
Lunda-Norte 3 1 1 - 
Lunda-Sul 3 - 2 - 
Malange 5 - - - 
Moxico 4 1 - - 
Namibe 4 1  - 
Uíge 3 2  - 
Zaire 2 1  2 
All Provincial circles 58 27 3 2 
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MPLA is represented in all provincial circles, except for Bié. In fact, in 13 provinces it 
has a majority of deputies (3 or more) and in 3 provinces it holds all 5 mandates. 
UNITA is represented in 13 of the 18 provincial circles, but holds the majority of 
mandates in only 4 provinces, including Bié where it holds all the mandates. PRS is 
represented only in the Lundas, the stronghold of the Chokwe ethnic group; and FNLA 
is represented only in the provincial circle of Zaire, which is predominantly Bakongo. 
 
While the Bicesse agreements were about multiparty democracy, the Lusaka Protocol – 
formally seen as an addendum to the Bicesse Accords – defined a power sharing 
arrangement between MPLA and UNITA. Under the provisions for reconciliation 
between the conflicting parties, UNITA's leadership would receive private residences, 
political offices in each province, and central headquarters in Luanda. UNITA leaders 
would also hold a series of posts as ministers, deputy ministers, ambassadors, 
provincial and deputy governors, and municipal, deputy and commune administrators. 
Although much of what was agreed at Lusaka turned out to be unimplementable, a so-
called Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was finally set up in 
April 1997, with UNITA holding four Minister posts (Trade; Geology and Mines; 
Health; and Hotels and Tourism) and seven Deputy-Minister posts (Defence; Interior; 
Finance; Agriculture; Public Services; Social Reintegration; and Social Communication). 
These portfolio allocations continue to this day. 
 
Although the creation of the GURN seemed at first an important political concession 
from MPLA, it also had great benefits for the President’s party, because it put UNITA 
in a double bind: it was no longer just the main opposition party, fighting the 
government through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means, it was also at the 
same time part of the Government. Inevitably, at some point those members of UNITA 
leadership in ministerial positions  would have to chose between their allegiance to the 
Head of Government and their allegiance to the President of UNITA. The potential for 
this situation leading to a break-up of UNITA was obvious and it materialised in 
September 1998, when the Government suspended the participation of its UNITA 
members, as well as that of the UNITA members of Parliament, pending a clarification 
of their loyalty to the Lusaka protocol. This crisis led to a split between those who 
wanted continued access to power, and came to form UNITA-Renovada and those who 
were willing to go back to the bush and help Savimbi in his increasingly desperate quest 
for the Presidency. The UNITA-Renovada members of cabinet were reinstated, the 
others were expelled. The split between the two fractions was patched up after 
Savimbi’s death, but it remains a fault line in UNITA. 
 
The President has made it clear that UNITA’s members of Government serve entirely at 
his pleasure, like those from his own Party. He may chose not to appoint certain 
candidates nominated by UNITA and he may chose to retain UNITA’s incumbents 
even after they have lost UNITA’s support – as is actually the case at the time of 
writing.  
 
Thus, it may be argued that one of the main aspects of the legacy of Lusaka has been a 
“power-sharing” arrangement that undermines UNITA’s autonomy and credibility 
both as opposition and as Government and effectively neutralises it on both fronts.   
  24 
The political parties 
The three historical parties (MPLA, UNITA and FNLA) all began as national liberation 
movements, each of them weaving various ideological strands into a fight against the 
Portuguese colonial power and later against each other. How these movements evolved 
ideologically is largely related to the external support that was available – from the 
United States, the Soviet block, at times from China also, and regionally from 
interested parties such as South Africa and the Congos. That support in turn followed a 
logic of its own, dictated by superpower rivalry and or other political conditions 
exogenous to Angola, such as the apartheid regime’s struggle for survival. 
 
MPLA went through a bloody ideological crisis in 1977, when an ultra-leftist coup 
attempt led by Nito Alves was quashed and an unknown number of militants, that 
some put in the thousands, were liquidated. That crisis seems to have weaned MPLA 
away for any interest in ideological controversy and the party shed its last nominal 
Marxist-Leninist references at its 3rd Congress in 1990 in what was a relatively 
consensual affair. In 2004, the party formally ceased to operate through cells based in 
the workplaces – organisational units are now territorial. 
 
A visit to MPLA’s headquarters suggests that the Party has lost much of its formal 
power. The building appears very quiet – militants and cadres who used to work there 
are now tending to more lucrative pursuits. But the Party remains what many see as the 
only institution in Angola that is present in every village, town and city ward – a 
greater degree of presence than even the church or the army. The Party is not known to 
have financial resource constraints: it was well placed to take over businesses that were 
privatised by the Government and as long as it remains the Government Party it is 
unlikely to run out of discretionary funds. Besides, like the other parties, it receives 
from the Ministry of Finance US$ 10 per year for every vote that it got at the 1992 
Parliamentary elections.  
 
However, MPLA’s greatest asset may be the intellectual and technical clout of the elites 
that it nurtured, in a country so desperately short in educated people. Many of these 
middle class Angolans may have lost interest in the Party, or be outright disgusted by 
its corrupt political culture, but politically they have nowhere to go: no other party has 
as yet come close to present a suitable alternative. 
 
As the incumbent party, MPLA will go into the elections with an overwhelming 
advantage in relation to UNITA – not to speak of the rest of the opposition, which has 
very limited technical, political and institutional capacity. MPLA has always presented 
itself as a nation building, inclusive and militantly non-ethnic party – contrary to 
UNITA, FNLA and the much smaller PRS, for whom ethnicity is very much part of the 
political calculation. MPLA is putting forward policies, projects and plans, promising 
reform – including more transparency and greater investments in basic services. The 
national daily, the national radio and television, which are all controlled by the 
Government, ensure that the message gets across to the best effect – while the 
opposition, to the extent that it has the capacity to respond, appears to be 
systematically reactive rather than proactive, divided and ridden with struggles for 
personal power.        
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The Presidency 
In September 2004, José Eduardo dos Santos celebrated 25 years as President of 
Angola. He his currently the third longest sitting ruler of Sub-Saharan Africa, after 
President Eyadema of Togo and President Bongo of Gabon. Such political longevity is 
not only uncommon – it is also quite astonishing, given the military and political 
turmoil that have characterized Angola since independence. He managed to survive not 
only most of his peers on the African continent, but entire regimes (communism, 
apartheid) – and what counts most, the most determined of his political enemies, Jonas 
Savimbi of UNITA.   
 
His style of governance is an object of fascination to most watchers of Angolan politics. 
As President of the Republic, President of the ruling party, Head of Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, his mandate and powerbase is significant. 
Yet, compared to the tyrannies exercised by many of his peers in comparable situations 
in Africa, his rule has been restrained and relatively benevolent. In spite of the 
subservience of the official media, cult of personality is kept to decorous levels. 
Although those who have worked with him assure that he has difficulty relinquishing 
power to others, even in matters of detail, the public image that he cultivates is that of 
a statesman who advises and suggests, but does not actually run the business of 
Government. In the official lingo, he does not “preside” or “lead” the sessions of the 
Council of Ministers. He “orientates” them.    
 
Among the means at his disposal to enforce allegiance and loyalty, he uses the carrot 
much more than the stick. The most spectacular demonstration of this was perhaps the 
way the UNITA leadership was treated following the military operation that killed 
Savimbi: they could all have been easily liquidated but, instead, they were shown mercy 
and no efforts were spared to facilitate their “reconciliation”; those who needed 
medical attention were brought to the Military Hospital in Luanda, Angola’s best 
health facility, or sent abroad for treatment; their children were given scholarships. For 
an authoritarian regime of this calibre, it is also remarkable that there are no political 
prisoners in the country4.     
 
His ideological leanings are unknown; he does not fulminate in public against his 
adversaries in the country or against foreign powers. He has steered the conversion of 
the MPLA from a virtual Marxist Leninist party into a centre-left party with full 
membership in the Socialist International – and perhaps even, some critics say, a mere 
commercial association with no social agenda. He also repositioned Angola from what 
many in the West saw as a frightening bridgehead of Soviet influence in Central Africa, 
to an increasingly warm ally of the United State and was rewarded with a visit to 
President Bush in the White House in May 2004.   
 
He appoints and dismisses ministers; as president of the MPLA, he also has a say on 
how the party’s parliamentary bench is run – and that bench comprises 59 per cent of 
the seats in parliament, virtually ensuring that any law supported by the President will 
pass, except perhaps for constitutional laws that would require a two-thirds majority. 
                                                 
4 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2004 notes a number of human rights violations in the country, 
including brief detentions of demonstrators and journalists as well more serious violations related to the 
repression of the insurgency in Cabinda. 
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But the strength of the Parliament has not really been tested: most legislation is 
established by presidential decree and parliamentary debates tend to be perfunctory, 
superficial and with no surprising outcomes. The centre of power is in the presidency – 
the President himself and his inner circle of advisers and relatives, known as “the 
Futungo”, from the name of the presidential compound at Futungo de Belas in the 
outskirts of Luanda, where José Eduardo dos Santos used to reside until recently. One 
of the functions of the Futungo is to arbitrate the system of informal incentives and 
rewards for good political behaviour, that has provided politicians, the military brass 
and the President’s family members with fabulous opportunities for enrichment and 
unaccountable personal fortunes.  
 
One of the week points of this system of control is the post of Prime Minister. The 
Prime Minister is often deputised to represent the President, but, although the post has 
high visibility – certainly more visibility than the President on a day-to-day basis – it is 
a mere political housekeeping function, with no real power. However, it has happened 
in the past that Prime Ministers, men such as Lopo do Nascimento and Marcolino 
Moco, strengthened by their standing in the party, sought to stake their own course – 
resulting in their prompt dismissal and subsequent political marginalisation. The 
difficulty to operationalise these functions is such that the President may well decide 
that he might do better without a Prime Minister: the position was abolished in 
December 1978 and only reinstated some 13 years later, in July 1991, following the 
Bicesse agreements; later, the post remained vacant between January 1999, following 
the dismissal of França van Dunem, to December 2002, when the current Primes 
Minister, Fernando Piedade dos Santos, was appointed. Mr. Piedade dos Santos had 
previously been director of the police and Minister of the Interior, and is thought to 
have impeccable loyalty credentials.  
 
Some analysts have suggested that José Eduardo dos Santos is now at the highest point 
of his political career – having won the war and brought Angola to the point where it 
could start rebuilding and developing as a democratic, peaceful country. The 
implication is that he should consider stepping down now, “while the going is good”. 
However, as it is often the case with regimes of this nature, there is no orderly 
mechanism for succession and continuity once the strong man leaves the scene – it is 
always too soon to groom a successor, lest he became a rival, and then it is suddenly 
too late. There is also the pesky problem of personal immunity once the ruler leaves 
office – especially when the ruler’s reputation is as tainted by corruption as is the case 
here.  
 
José Eduardo dos Santos indicated in 2001 that he would not run again for election; 
more recently, however, he has sometimes suggested that he might reconsider his 
decision “in response to popular demand” while on other occasions he has spoken of 
profound political changes in the couple of years ahead.  
 
The question of the future of Angola lies much more fundamentally on what will 
happen to the Presidency in the next few years, should José Eduardo dos Santos need 
or want to step down, more than on the results of the Parliamentary elections. As we 
argue later in this report, the results of the elections are to a large extent predictable. 
On the contrary, the turmoil that may ensue from the presidential succession process, 
which is likely to undermine - or at least severely disturb – a number of corrupt power-
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balance arrangements, is essentially unpredictable and could have many different 
outcomes, including very negative ones. 
Civil society 
Civil society organisations are also a product of the post-Bicesse liberalisation and they 
have received considerable attention from the international donor community; as is 
generally the case in developing countries, civil society organisations are seen as useful 
channels to target humanitarian and development assistance to specific population 
groups; in addition, they enable donors to bypass the Government, when donors have 
doubts about the Government’s implementation capacity and integrity or simply do not 
wish aid resources to be seen as an expression of political support for the Government. 
With respect to Angola specifically, in addition to those considerations, there is also a 
sense that civil society organisations may lift the political arena from its sterile MPLA-
UNITA deadlock. That was particularly the case in the final years of the war, where a 
burgeoning movement emerged around the notions that there would be no military 
solution to the conflict, and that peace and reconciliation had to be sought through 
dialogue, to identify the root causes of the conflict and viable forms of accommodation. 
This view was strongly supported by the churches and organisations of religious 
inspiration such as Jubileu 2000, and by the Government of South Africa – keen to 
export its model of post-apartheid reconciliation to the various conflict zones of Africa.    
 
The events of 2002 proved the so-called peace movement wrong – there was indeed a 
military solution to the conflict and it hinged on the elimination of Jonas Savimbi 
personally. Without Savimbi, the war was effectively over. The bullet that killed 
Savimbi also wounded, perhaps fatally, civil society organisations as a potentially 
significant political force rallied around the call for peace. 
 
This does not mean that civil society organisations have no role to play; as in other 
countries, they enable the representation of interests that are not readily accommodated 
by the political parties and they can be an important supplement and corrective element 
to party politics. There are still many conflictual situations in Angola – some rooted in 
political intolerance, others in ethnic prejudice and competition for economic resources 
– and it is important that such conflicts of interests are articulated, studied and acted 
upon to prevent their escalation into violence. 
The electorate 
At the initiative of the International Republican Institute (IRI), an organisation of the 
US Republican Party, the Angolan social research centre AIP conducted in 2003 a 
survey of people’s perceptions in relation to the coming elections (AIP 2004). The 
survey was conducted among 4,300 persons aged 18 and over, drawn from 7 of 
Angola’s 18 provinces (estimated to comprise some 85% of the country’s population). 
This was the first political poll ever conducted in Angola and provides a fascinating 
picture of Angolans’ attitudes with regard to political processes. 
 
The survey reveals a high degree of politicisation of the population, with over one third 
of the respondents being current members of a political party (half of them described as 
activists); additionally, five per cent are former members of a political party. This 
relatively high level of formal and active party affiliation may reflect the tradition of 
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State-party culture, which provided many incentives, formal and informal, for people 
to become members. In explaining the reasons for membership, which are often 
multiple, nine in ten people cite the party’s political programme and about half of them 
cite the charisma of the leadership. Factors like the party’s regional (i.e., ethnic-based) 
power, the material advantages of being a member or the example of families and 
friends are each mentioned by nearly half of the people.  
 
In spite of the limited electoral experience, according to the survey the majority of 
Angolans (nine out of ten) understand that voting is a right rather than an imposition. 
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of the respondents consider that elections are important 
for all, and slightly more than half believe that they can “change things for the better”. 
Although respondents that were of voting age in 1992 seem to approach the coming 
elections with more scepticism than last time, only about 20 per cent express negative 
attitudes (such as either doubts that the elections will bring change or certainty that 
they will bring no change at all) and one in ten say that they mistrust the whole 
process. A notable change of attitude in relation to 1992 is that there is now 
considerably less fear and uncertainty about what the results of the election will bring, 
compared to what people now say they felt in 1992. The idea that people will not vote 
because they associate elections with war is not borne out by the survey – although 
such attitudes were detected in limited areas and small subgroups of the voting 
population. 
 
However, the survey suggests that a lower proportion of people may vote this time 
compared to the first elections. In the sample, 86 per cent of the respondents who were 
of voting age in 1992 said to have voted, while only 68 per cent of all respondents now 
say that they will vote in the coming elections and 23 per cent were undecided. In order 
for the abstention rate to remain at the same level as in 1992, eight out of ten presently 
undecided would need to be persuaded to vote. Depending on what happens in the run 
up to the elections, more people may decide that they will not vote, particularly if they 
think that the outcome of the election is predetermined by the relative strength of the 
contending parties.  
 
This is a cause of great concern to MPLA leaders, not because they worry that they 
would not win the elections, but because the legitimacy that they seek from the 
elections for continued MPLA rule is based on a high electoral turn-out. A hollow 
victory,  not only would not play well with those who have a stake in the 
democratisation process – the opposition, civil society and the international community 
– but would also deligitimise the formal political arena as the place where change can 
be fought for and achieved. It is expected that in their campaign MPLA leaders will 
stress the civic value and the personal satisfaction of exercising the right to vote – like 
people attend sporting events for the love of the sport even when the outcome of the 
match appears highly predictable. 
 
The majority of respondents (eight out of ten) assume that new elections will be freer 
and fairer than in 1992. The survey also attempted to discover what criteria people 
would use to determine whether elections were free and fair. For most people (nearly 
nine out of ten respondents) it is access to the voting act itself: that no citizen of voting 
age be prevented from registering as voter, and that no citizen with a voter’s card be 
prevented from voting. The first concern highlights the importance of the electoral 
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preparations, the second the importance of proper supervision of the voting itself. 
These concerns are highlighted more specifically by other criteria, mentioned by about 
three quarters of the respondents, such as the appointment of a competent and non-
partisan president of the National Electoral Commission  and possibility for political 
parties to have access to the polling stations and to be present at the counting of the 
votes. The presence of international observers was seen as important by two thirds of 
the respondents; a United Nations presence, specifically, was mentioned by a smaller 
majority, with people in Luanda been keener on it.  
 
Consistent with those concerns, respondents appeared receptive to the Government’s 
arguments regarding the need to delay elections until a number of material conditions 
are met. In respect of what factors they considered would determine the quality of the 
elections, most respondents (again eight out of ten) mentioned the return of internally 
displaced persons and the conclusion of the demobilisation process; factors such as the 
time necessary for the establishment of the electoral register or the reorganization of 
the political parties were also mentioned by about three quarters of the respondents – 
the latter factor being particularly prominent in the minds of respondents in the capital. 
Only a small majority of respondents mentioned the political will to set a date for the 
elections as a condition for the quality of the process. In other words, no matter how 
impatient people may be for elections to be held, there is a clear sense that they need to 
be done right – and for that there are clearly many obstacles and issues that need to be 
resolved.   
 
The survey did not ask which party the respondents favoured – it would be too 
sensitive. But it tried to ascertain to what extent people remained loyal to the party that 
they voted for in 1992 – under certain assumptions, it could give an indication of the 
extent to which the results of the coming elections would duplicate those of 1992.  
 
The emerging picture is a very open one. First of all it must be noted that roughly half 
of the voting age population in 2006 would have been born after 1974 and were 
therefore too young to vote in 1992. Secondly, among the people who voted in 1992 
(hereafter, “the older voters”) only about half say that they will vote for the same 
party, while less than one in ten say that they will not vote for the same party. This 
leaves about 40 per cent of the “older voter” population to be won over either by the 
government or the opposition. The important point is that, contrary to some popular 
speculation, there is no massive trend of MPLA voters or UNITA voters joining “the 
other side” either because MPLA did not deliver on its promises or because UNITA 
restarted the war. But a significant group of “older voters” are not sure of their 
allegiances and might be persuaded to vote differently this time. 
 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the survey is its probing of people’s perceptions 
of the political parties. In spite of the relatively high levels of formal political affiliation, 
there is an abundance of negative feelings and connotations regarding the way political 
parties operate. The most common complaint displayed is the distance between voters 
and their elected representatives – almost eight out of ten respondents say that party 
leaders and members of parliament are never around to listen to the concerns of their 
constituents. Thee quarters of the respondents agree that many parties have been 
diverted from their original purpose and transformed in pressure groups to serve the 
interests of a handful of  individuals. Two thirds of the respondents see a link between 
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the poor performance of public services and the close ties of public officials to political 
parties. Half of the respondents believe that in order to get a good job, one needs to 
belong to a political party. There is also widespread resignation or cynicism regarding 
political corruption: only 60 per cent of the respondents state that they would 
withdraw their support if they knew that some of the party’s leaders were corrupt. 
 
The study also enquired about which institutions were most trustworthy and least 
trustworthy to solve people’s problems. A detailed interpretation of the replies is not 
easy – in particular because there is a large atomisation of the replies among the 22 
institutions proposed, as well as a polarisation of attitudes, often along a divide 
centre/periphery (i.e., Luanda/Other provinces). In general, based on the balance 
between “most trustworthy” and “least trustworthy” ratings for each institution, it 
appears that people tend to have a dim view of public institutions – in particular the 
police – and the political parties. That attitude is specially strong in Luanda, where 
discredit is also attached to local administration institutions, the Parliament and its 
members, and the courts. The most trusted institutions are the churches, and the 
widespread perception of the churches as a reliable solver of people’s problems suggests 
that there is considerable political capital in the hands of the church authorities. People 
in the periphery put great confidence in the President, who is much less trusted in 
Luanda: in the periphery, people’s awareness of the President’s immense discretionary 
powers possibly weighs more than his inaccessibility. The Governmental media (in 
particular the national radio and the public television station) show surprising strength 
in trustworthiness among Luanda respondents, while people in the other provinces are 
more reserved.   
 
Concerning the question of what voters considered as the most important factor for 
their choice of candidates, the study revealed that respondents did not seem to attach 
much importance to the party affiliation, or even the ideas of the candidate: less than 
10 per cent of the respondents cited those factors – less than 5 per cent for party 
affiliation. The main consideration cited by most respondents was the candidate’s 
reputation for not being corrupt, followed by previous political experience, and 
previous government experience. This would support our assumption that the power of 
incumbency will favour MPLA in the coming elections, possibly outweighing the 
negative effect of MPLA’s reputation for corruption.  
The media 
Article 32 of the 1992 Constitutional Law asserts that “freedom of expression, 
assembly, demonstration, association, and all other forms of expression shall be 
guaranteed” and in the run up to the election, there was a burgeoning of the 
independent media – mostly weekly newspapers and magazines. As the country 
reverted to war, however, severe restrictions were again imposed on all forms of 
political dissent, including in the media – both by the Government and UNITA in the 
areas under their respective control. With the end of the conflict in 2002, there was 
again a relaxation of those restrictions particularly in the printed media. As Human 
Rights Watch notes in its recent report “in 2003 alone, four new weekly newspapers 
were established and the detention of journalists became less common” (Human Rights 
Watch 2004). However, there have been episodes of intimidation (including arbitrary 
detention) of journalists working on stories that could embarrass political personalities 
and the Government has at its disposal an arsenal of laws, including defamation laws 
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that criminalize criticism of the Government and other public authorities. Although 
such laws have not been applied in recent years, Human Rights Watch finds that 
“national legislation still imposes greater restrictions on freedom of expression than 
permissible under the constitution (or international law)”. 5 
 
There is still only one daily newspaper, Jornal de Angola, which is controlled by the 
Government and serves as mouthpiece for MPLA’s  views and positions. The reach of 
the private media remains largely limited to Luanda and some coastal urban areas and, 
given the high levels of illiteracy, the low purchasing power of the population and the 
lack of transport and distribution infrastructure, the impact of the printed media 
beyond the Luanda middle classes is probably negligible.  
 
Radio broadcasts are a different matter, and the Government has steadfastly opposed 
the efforts of Radio Ecclesia, a catholic private radio station transmitting on FM in 
Luanda, to start broadcasting nationally on the AM band. Unlike FM transmitters, 
which have a limited territorial coverage, one AM transmitter could cover most of 
Angola’s extensive territory. The Government has argued that in many countries AM 
frequencies are reserved for official radio stations. Radio Ecclesia therefore requested 
permission to broadcast nationally on FM, but the Government has not responded. In 
fact, the Governor of Huíla recently stepped in to prevented the catholic seminary in 
Lubango to set up an FM transmitter. Radio Ecclesia has often been critical of the 
Government, and its hugely popular call-in programmes offer listeners a unique 
opportunity to vent discontent and frustration against the authorities. Given the high 
level of confidence that people have in the Church, as attested by the results of the 
IRI/AIP survey, and the Church’s actual and potential role in the political arena, 
offering it a national broadcasting platform is a step that the present Government is not 
enthusiastic about making – at least not as long as the Ministry of Information remains 
in the hands of Hendrik Vaal Neto, an ex-FNLA leader turned MPLA. 
                                                 
5 For a detailed analysis of the legislation, including specific wording, see Human Rights Watch 2004.  
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5. Political developments in 2003-2004: Towards 
an election date 
Elections: calendar and modalities  
The only multiparty elections Angola have ever held took place on 29 and 30 
September 1992, with simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.  Although 
international observers declared the elections to have been fair, Jonas Savimbi, who 
came second in the first round of the presidential election, did not accept the results, 
withdrew from Luanda and restarted the war.  
 
Until the war formally ceased with the Luena agreement in April 2002, the scope for 
organising credible elections was limited. Towards the end of the war, however, with 
Savimbi diplomatically isolated and militarily contained, elections appeared 
increasingly as a long overdue step. Many voices in the opposition and civil society 
questioned the legitimacy of the sitting parliament, which had been elected for a term 
long expired, and the even shakier legitimacy of the presidential mandate, given that 
the required second round of the presidential election had never taken place. Among 
the donor community, the United States led the pressures in that direction, in particular 
through an ad-hoc entity called Consortium for of Elections and Political Process 
Strengthening, formed by three US-based organisations (the International Foundation 
for Election Systems, the International Republican Institute and the National 
Democratic Institute). They conducted a so-called “Joint Pre-election Assessment” in 
August 2001, to determine the prospects for holding general elections (IFES 2002). The 
Consortium did not propose a specific date for elections, but identified a number of 
“critical processes” that needed to be undertaken to make the elections administratively 
sound and legitimate, and estimated the authorities would likely need at least 18 
months to organize elections according to the existing laws and regulations and 
consistent with the recommendations of the Assessment.  
 
It may be useful to recall here the detailed schedule of tasks and timeline suggested by 
the Consortium, which was based on internationally accepted criteria for elections, 
including those developed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Parliamentary Forum: 
 
A. 12 to 24 months before elections 
1. Determine what kind of elections will be held 
2. Delimit Constituencies 
3. Draft National Electoral Commission (NEC) regulations 
4. Nominate NEC members 
5. Approve Electoral Law 
6. Consolidate laws to ensure consistency among laws governing elections at national through 
local levels 
 
B. 12 months before elections 
1. Survey of voter register – predict number of eligible voters 
2. Publish Election Calendar/timeframe for election date 
3. Independent, chartered accounting firm on board 
4. Hire full NEC Staff/office space/supplies 
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5. Adopt budget allocations  
6. Draft budget to cover elements/materials including but not limited to: 
a. Staff time for overall and discrete election activities, such as training, staffing the 
registration update/card issuance, voter education processes 
b. Creation of a voter register, whether via issuance of “universal” ID cards for all, or an 
additional special voter registration receipt – plus funds/time to amend and exhibit a 
final version before the elections 
c. Election forms – carbonless but in duplicate 
d. Ballots – design, size, envelopes, etc. 
e. Ballot boxes – assuming that nothing is left over from 1992 
f. Voting booths – these can be manufactured locally 
g. Polling station supplies (including wire “in-box” trays for ballot bundles) 
h. Signs/Tents for Assembleia de Registro/Voto 
i. Media/Civic education blanket coverage 
j. Enforcement of election/campaign rules and regulations 
k. Tabulation system/centres 
 
C. 90 days to 11 months before election 
1. Open registration period – centres open 30 days, announced at least two months in advance –  
population encouraged to register; advance publicity for election date 
2. Review/input of results by CNE at provincial and national level, create provisional register 
(30 days) 
3. Register exhibited, parties and voters encouraged to confirm they are listed properly 
4. Review results, input data changes, produce final register 90 days before the election by 
national and provincial CNEs – make available at cost or reduced cost to political parties 
5. Issue voter registration cards 
6. Distribute materials to registration centres 
7. Train staff 
8. Kick-off voter registration education campaign 
9. Accredit domestic and international monitors/observers 
10. Order/receipt of voter registration supplies 
11. Identify voter registration stations 
12. Survey potential sites for registration/polling stations – accessibility, stationary vs. mobile – 
in conjunction with national ID cards? How many trips can/should Angolans make for 
registration and voting? 
 
D. 30 to 90 days before election 
1. Order ballot materials 
2. Nomination Day 
3. Kick-off (or new phase of ) voter education campaign 
 
E. Final 30 days before election eve 
1. Deadline for all eligible people to be registered 
2. Distribution of non-sensitive materials to polling stations 
3. Final day of campaign 
4. Pollworker training 
 
F. Election Day(s) 
1. Actual voting 
2. Preliminary results transmission at polling station, provincial and national levels 
 
G. Post Election day(s) – up to 6 months following 
1. Certification and Release of complete results (72 hours after the national count is complete) 
2. Adjudication of election disputes 
3. Accounting/Expense Reconciliation/Audit of financial statements 
4. Production of Final Report (25 days after the certification of final results) 
 
The Government’s response to the Consortium was that elections should be held as 
soon as practicable, but that it was nevertheless essential to ensure that the 
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preparations were of such quality that the validity of the results of electoral results 
could not be questioned and lead to a repeat of the 1992 disaster. Every time the 
question of the elections was raised, the standard response from the Government was 
that proper conditions for elections needed to be created – without much evidence that 
concrete steps were being taken towards that end.    
 
What calculation lies behind the Government’s reluctance to act is unclear. It is 
generally believed that the Government could have won by a large margin had it 
organised elections in 2002, with UNITA deeply divided politically and in 
organisational disarray following Savimbi’s death.  
 
Nevertheless, it would have been a largely hollow victory, and undoubtedly seen as 
such by the international community, since at that point logistical conditions would 
have been much worse than in 1992 - many areas were inaccessible, or had been 
destroyed and their inhabitants displaced. The ostensible reason for the delay 
articulated by MPLA was that the country was not ready for elections – neither 
materially, nor psychologically. Time was necessary to rebuild some of the critical 
infrastructure destroyed by the war, put in place an electoral apparatus (comprising 
both institutions and legislation) and let the emotional wounds of the war heal before 
the electoral campaign stirred up conflict once again.  
 
Apart from the validity of that argument, UNITA initially needed time to overcome its 
serious internal divisions, reorganise and re-establish itself before it could fight an 
election – so it certainly welcomed a respite. But subsequently, there was a growing 
sense in public opinion that the Government wanted to delay elections indefinitely, 
because of the advantages of incumbency and MPLA’s inherently undemocratic State 
party culture. Many have argued that sections of the elite derive extraordinary benefits 
from the predatory practices of the present regime, its corruption and unaccountability, 
and thus would like it to continue forever. Others point at the more legitimate desire 
on the part of the Government to build up a portfolio of achievements before MPLA 
candidates have to face the voters. In any case, given the electoral history of Angola, 
the President had undoubtedly a point when he affirmed, during his visit to 
Washington in May 2004 that “we would not like to rush into holding elections like 
we did in 1992. We would like to prepare the elections so that Angolans may 
conscientiously take part in the polls and freely elect the candidates of their choice, and 
ultimately the results accepted by the people as a whole.”  
 
Countering Government’s inaction, UNITA in August 2003 seized the initiative and  
presented its own list of tasks leading up to elections. The schedule comprised 16 tasks 
as follows: 
 
1. Approval of the electoral legal package: 
1.1. New Constitution; 
1.2. Abrogation of act 18/96, in particular the clause stipulating that a population census 
must be held prior to future elections 
1.3. Electoral law 
1.4. Law on electoral observation 
2. End to the extension of the administration of the State 
3. Restoration of the freedom of movement (persons and goods) 
4. Campaign for special free civil registration of adults and issuance of ID cards 
5. Abolition of the Civil Defence Organisation and disarmament of the civilian population 
  35 
6. Resettlement of displaced persons 
7. Creation of an Independent National Electoral Commission 
8. Creation of independent Provincial Electoral Commissions and National Directorate of 
Elections 
9. Electoral registration 
10.  Training of electoral staff 
11.  Preparation of electoral materials 
12.  Civic education 
13.  Presentation of candidatures for parliamentary and presidential elections 
14.  Disbursement of funds for the candidates’ electoral campaign 
15.  Electoral campaign 
16.  Conclusion of the preparatory electoral process. 
   
 
UNITA indicated that it would be possible to hold the elections by mid-2005 if there 
was sufficient political will on the part of the Government to do so, even taking into 
account the need for sound preparations.  
 
Six months later, MPLA responded with a memorandum presenting the party’s own list 
of tasks. This was the first articulation by the party in power of what they had in mind 
specifically when they alluded to ”conditions” that had to be created prior to holding 
elections. The list was as follows: 
 
1. Discussion and approval of a National Consensus Agenda with the participation of all 
relevant stakeholders 
2. Drafting, discussion and approval of the Voter Registration Law 
3. Preparation of technical and logistical conditions for voter registration 
4. Schedule of voter registration 
5. Approval of the new Constitution 
6. Drafting, discussion and approval of the electoral laws, consistent with the parameters 
defined by the new Constitution 
7. Set up the electoral management body (National Electoral Commission or Council) 
8. Immediate tasks of the electoral management body 
9. Reconfirmation of registered voters 
10.  On-site assessment by both national and international institutions to determine whether the 
conditions in the country are suitable for holding elections 
11.  Scheduling of the elections by the appropriate constitutional entity, 3 to 6 months prior to 
the election 
12.  Presentation of candidatures for President and Parliament to the appropriate body 
13.  Start of the electoral campaign and voting 
14.  Consolidation and implementation of the National Consensus Agenda 
    
The publication of this memorandum greatly exasperated the opposition. Some of the 
tasks proposed by MPLA were reasonable, some were not. But there was a sense that 
even reasonable tasks were not being undertaken and would probably not even begin 
without a definite timeline for election. Given that MPLA controls both the legislative 
and the executive power, action cannot proceed unless and until endorsed by MPLA.  
The constitutional tangle 
Looking at both lists, it is worth noting that UNITA and MPLA agreed on the need for 
a new constitution prior to elections. As the USAID-funded Consortium had noted, the 
constitution neither facilitates nor inhibits the election process, because electoral 
procedures are covered in the electoral law – technically speaking, a new constitution 
would not be a prerequisite for elections. But to the extent that the constitution would 
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provide a framework for power sharing – as the Consortium put it, “a real peace treaty 
among political parties as well as civil society actors” – it would certainly be helpful, or 
perhaps essential. But MPLA wanted to go beyond that, and have the opposition also 
sign onto a “National Consensus Agenda” which would include a long-term 
development plan; and the elections would still be subject to a determination by 
unspecified entities that conditions were suitable.   
 
The opposition therefore decided to strike at a part of the legislative process in which 
the Government had shown in terest, namely the drafting of a constitution. Angola has 
been living with a Constitutional Law adopted in 1991 and amended on two 
subsequent occasions to fit evolving political circumstances. It had been drafted 
essentially as an enabling instrument for setting up a new Republic, based on the multi-
party democratic principles of the Bicesse Agreements. The Parliament of that 
Republic, once elected, would draw up a permanent  Constitution. That did not 
happen due to the resumption of the war, but in 1998 a 44-member Constitutional 
Commission was finally established with members drawn proportionaly from the 
various parliamentary groups (see box 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission in turn established a technical working group, mandated to prepare a 
draft project of the Constitution for consideration by the Commission. The technical 
working group consisted of 21 experts designated by five of the parties in the 
Commission (MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA and PLD) and was led by Prof. Rui Ferreira 
- an MPLA constitutional expert who coordinated in 1991 the revisions leading to the 
current Constitutional Law. 
 
By 2000, the Constitutional Commission had agreed on a set of 27 “fundamental 
principles” that were to guide the work on the future Constitution. Those include the 
principles that Angola should have a semi-presidential regime and a multiparty 
democratic system, with separation of the three branches of power; a market-oriented 
economy based on private entrepreneurial initiative; a non-partisan public 
administration; and institutional guarantees of freedom of the press.  
Box 5.1 - Political parties represented in the Constitutional Commission 
 
The Constitutional Commission is composed of 44 members, drawn from the deputies of the 
National Assembly. It consists of a President, 4 Vice-Presidents, 4 Secretaries and 35 other 
members. 
· MPLA – 25 members (including the President of the Commission, one Vice-President 
and one Secretary) 
· UNITA – 14 members, including one Vice-President and one Secretary 
· PRS – 1 member, Vice-President 
· FNLA – 1 member, Vice-President 
· PLD – 1 member, Secretary 
· AD-Coligação – 1 member, Secretary 
· PAJOCA – 1 member 
 
Source: http://www.comissao-constitucional.gv.ao/paginas/composicao.htm 
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In May 2004, just as the technical group completed its task, all the parties of the 
opposition, including UNITA, decided to suspend their participation in the 
Constitutional Commission until the President consulted with the parties and a definite 
timetable for the electoral process was approved. 
 
From that moment on, the political debate in Angola revolved around two entangled 
themes: the date of elections and the promulgation of the Constitution.    
 
On the elections front, in early July the President convened the Council of the Republic, 
an advisory body comprising the heads of all parties represented in Parliament and a 
number of other political personalities. The Council recommended that elections be 
held at a date “up to” September 2006 – a victory for the President, who had been 
publicly stating his preference for 2006 as the most likely date. Based on that time 
horizon, MPLA drew up a 2-year calendar for the preparation of the elections (see 
chart 5.1), which was subsequently adopted by the Council of Ministers.  
 
The opposition has tried to maintain its demand for elections in 2005 and presented an 
alternative calendar, but that option is becoming less feasible as time passes. The 
opposition’s current calendar does not include the adoption of the Constitution, just 
the package of electoral laws that would be adopted in the period up to December 
2004. Subsequently, the Government would “create the conditions for the installation 
of the National Electoral Commission”, a process to be concluded by February 2005. 
Another task scheduled by the opposition is the disarmament of the civilian population 
and the effective abolition of what the opposition calls “militias linked to MPLA 
Committees”, tasks that the Government has indicated intent to pursue but does not 
want to include in the electoral process.   
 
Another issue raised by the opposition – specifically, the Liberal Democratic Party led 
by former presidential candidate Anália da Vitória Pereira – concerned the timing of 
the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. She proposed that instead of holding 
simultaneous elections as in 1992, the Parliamentary election should be held first, to be 
followed by presidential elections one year later. According to media reports, in her 
view this sequence of events would give greater stability to the country – although it 
seems difficult to make that case convincingly, since it would in effect maintain the 
country in a state of heightened political agitation for a much longer period.  By 
October 2004, her proposal was not attracting much interest, perhaps also because of 
the added costs and the logistical problems that it would entail. (The Government has 
estimated that the elections would cost US$ 430 million, including US$ 90 million for 
voter registration alone, although the figure seemed exaggerated to many in the donor 
community). 
 
An interesting development was the almost bizarre demand put forward by the 
“Political Council of the Opposition”, a little known coalition of 14 small parties put 
together by Alberto Neto, leader of PDA: instead of holding a regular presidential 
election, the Council called for the Government to organise the second round of the 
1992 presidential election. The reasoning behind this proposal was that, as stipulated 
by the electoral law, if one of the two top candidates died or gave up between the two 
rounds of the election, the third most voted candidate would take his place. In this 
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case, since the second most voted candidate, Jonas Savimbi had died, Alberto Neto, 
who came third with about 2 per cent of the vote in 1992 would be competing against 
José Eduardo dos Santos. One might expect that this demand would be quickly 
dismissed as an absurdity by the political establishment, given the reality of the facts 
and the legal determination that the second round of the presidential elections should 
be held not later than one month after the first round. However, several MPLA leaders 
– most notably Bornito de Sousa, leader of the MPLA’s parliamentary group - offered 
encouragement, declaring that it was an idea that “made sense” and which the 
parliamentary groups ought to discuss. Of course, nothing would suit MPLA better 
than an election in which the sitting President would be challenged by a candidate with 
no name recognition, backed by a party with insignificant following. On the other 
hand it would be hard to convince democratic-minded voters, and indeed the main 
opposition parties, as well as the international opinion, that this would be a 
worthwhile, legitimate and credible electoral exercise.6 
The Constitution 
On the constitutional front, the Government first pressed for the opposition to return 
to the Constitutional Commission, leaders of MPLA describing the situation as one of 
“constitutional crisis”. After progress had been achieved on the question of the 
calendar, the opposition continued to boycott the Commission, pressing for additional 
concrete steps such as the creation of an Electoral Commission. At that point, the 
Government changed tactics asserting that since the technical group had produced a 
good draft project of the Constitution, the Constitutional Commission could now be 
abolished, the discussion of that draft and its eventual adoption taking place in the 
plenary of the National Assembly. 
 
MPLA considers it essential that a new Constitution be adopted before the elections. 
The main argument put forward by the Government is that voters need clarity about 
the “rules of the game” and what kind of mandate they are giving to those being 
elected. UNITA and other opposition parties now see no need for that particular 
sequence of events: they think that elections could be held under the present 
constitutional law, perhaps with some amendments, and with a legislative package 
regulating specific aspects of the electoral process. Besides, a freshly elected parliament 
would have much greater legitimacy as a Constitutional body than the current National 
Assembly, elected in 1992. At the end of September, the main parties of the opposition 
(UNITA, PRS, FNLA, PLD, FpD, PDP-ANA and the POC coalition) put forward a set 
of laws in a package meant to cover all aspects of the electoral process, including the 
official recognition and financing of political parties, voter registration, the national 
electoral council, electoral monitoring and international observation of the elections, 
and the role of the mass media. Presenting the package to the opinion the opposition 
pointedly underscored that the proposed legislative package was consistent with the 
current constitution.   
 
                                                 
6 In November 2004, after the conclusion of drafting of the present report, President Eduardo dos Santos 
indicated that the idea of holding a second round of the election should be examined by the Supreme 
Court and the Parliament, suggesting that he was favourable to it. Additionally, he expressed support for 
holding the presidential elections in 2007, one year after the parliamentary elections.  
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It is clear that MPLA is deeply committed to a new constitution and that it has invested  
considerable effort in this enterprise. The technical working group met assiduously for 
nearly 5 years and produced a project containing over 350 articles, most of them with 
numerous paragraphs and sub paragraphs. Underscoring the consensual nature of the 
work, Prof. Ferreira, who led the Technical Working Group, points to the fact that of 
27 fundamental principles adopted by the Constitutional Commission to guide the 
work on the draft proposal,  MPLA contributed 14 and the opposition parties 13; 
moreover, the group adopted its end product by consensus. 
 
By 2002, there were only three issues that the technical group could not resolve on its 
own, and which were left for the political parties to settle: (1) whether the Head of 
State should also be Head of Government (thus defining the nature of the regime as 
presidential or parliamentary); (2) whether there should be a second chamber in 
parliament; (3) and the whether the provincial governors should be appointed solely at 
the discretion of the President or should take into account the political leanings of the 
local population, which might be different from those of the President. In MPLA’s 
view, these questions were settled at the bilateral discussions held between MPLA and 
UNITA at Hotel Alvalade in Luanda in December 2002, and which resulted in the so-
called Alvalade agreements. At Alvalade, MPLA got UNITA to endorse a “semi-
presidential regime” in which the President was also head of Government; in turn 
MPLA agreed on the creation of the National Council for Local Affairs. It is not the 
Second Chamber that the opposition initially demanded, but in MPLA’s opinion it may 
in fact be more influential than a Second Chamber. MPLA also considers that it made 
an important concession in agreeing that, while the President retains the power to 
appoint the provincial governors, these will be nominated by the dominant political 
party in the province. 
 
MPLA leaders express surprise that UNITA now does not seem committed to the 
Constitution’s draft project, and point out that UNITA is torn between its State 
responsibilities and its role as leader of the opposition. Some observers have pointed 
out that UNITA has undergone a shift of leadership at its Congress in June 2003, so 
that the current Secretary-General, Isaias Samakuva, may not feel bound by the 
commitments undertaken by his rival Paulo Lukamba (“General Gato”), who was 
UNITA’s Secretary-General at the time of the Alvalade negotiations. This is not 
UNITA’s official position, however. Like the other parties of the opposition, they find 
the draft “too presidential”. Prof. Rui Ferreira has categorically rejected that 
characterization, describing the regime proposed by the draft project as “semi-
presidential with presidential leanings”. Other MPLA jurists, such as Prof. Adérito 
Correia, recognize that what is proposed is indeed a presidential regime and contend 
that a such a regime is the most appropriate for Angola. To further undercut UNITA’s 
arguments, Bornito de Sousa, leader of MPLA’s Parliamentary Group, quotes 
statements by the late Jonas Savimbi, who extolled the virtues of presidentialism as the 
system best suited to African values and culture. 
 
At the time of writing (November 2004), the dispute seems locked and the deadlock 
might continue for a few more months, since according to the MPLA calendar the 
adoption of the Constitution may be delayed until April 2005. The opposition, after 
saying that it would return to the Constitutional Commission, subsequently stalled 
again, asking for more progress on the electoral preparations. In fact, the opposition’s 
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basic stance is that elections should precede the adoption of a constitution and 
therefore there is little point in debating the draft project at this point. UNITA has also 
objected to the efforts made by the Government to give the public wide access to the 
draft project, notably by publishing it as a free 96-page supplement to Jornal de 
Angola, the national newspaper (República de Angola 2004). In UNITA’s view, this 
had the effect of unduly influencing public opinion towards the acceptance of the 
current draft, at a stage when it has not even been considered – much less adopted – by 
any constitutional organ and therefore has no status.  MPLA on the other hand, 
believes that it could find among the 91 members of the parliamentary opposition the 
17 votes that it needs to get the draft project adopted with a two thirds majority in the 
Plenary of the Assembly. Failing that, the Government has indicated that it would 
abandon the constitutional project for now, but would not permit any amendments to 
the current constitutional law, including those that might be required to facilitate the 
electoral process.7      
 
                                                 
7 The Constitutional Commission was finally abolished by Parliament on November 2004, with 96 votes 
in favour, 56 against and 4 abstentions, suggesting a split of opinion across parties. The tasks of the 
Constitutional Comission were transferred to the First Commission (Constitutional, Legal and 
Regulatory Affairs). 
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Chart 5.1 – Electoral timetable proposed by the MPLA in August 2004 
2004 2005 2006 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep  
Parliament approves and President 
promulgates new Constitution and 
electoral laws package 
                 
Electoral register is drawn up            
          NEC 
membership is 
approved by 
Parliament, 
President and 
political parties 
           
            NEC 
starts 
operating 
          
               NEC prepares electoral acts 
               Political parties participate in electoral activities 
                  Supreme Court 
approves candidates 
for legislative and 
presidential elections 
   
                   NEC declares 
country ready 
for elections 
   
                   President 
announces 
election date 
   
                    CNE 
allocates 
radio 
and TV 
slots 
   
                      Electoral 
campaign 
begins 
 
                       Election 
s 
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The National Electoral Council 
While much public attention has been given to the Constitution and the opposition’s 
boycott of the Constitutional Commission, considerably less interest has been devoted 
to the future National Electoral Commission (NEC) – how it should be constituted and 
how to ensure its independence, impartiality and authority, particularly in relation to 
the ruling party and the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which will be in charge 
of the electoral logistics. This relative neglect is a cause for concern, the NEC needs to 
establish itself into a technically credible, impartial and effective institution already well 
before the election, or risk discrediting the whole exercise.  
 
In the political setting of Angola, with limited experience of multiparty elections and a 
history of state party rule, there are suspicions that legitimately arise from a situation 
where the governing party is contesting the election – obviously doing all it possibly 
can to remain in power - and at the same time laying down the rules by which the 
contest should proceed. The NEC is the only instance that can attenuate these 
suspicions from the outset – electoral observation and monitoring, while also being 
crucial, will take place at a stage when the scope for corrective measures will have 
become severely limited. 
 
For the 1992 elections, the NEC was composed of members nominated by the 
President and ratified by the National Assembly. It was presided by a judge of the 
Supreme Court (selected by the Plenary of the Court) and included five specialists 
appointed by the President, the Minister of Territorial Administration, the Director 
General of Elections (appointed by the President after consultation with the political 
parties), one representative of the National Council on Social Communication, a 
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one representative of each registered 
political party and one representative of each of the presidential candidates. The 
Provincial Councils and the Municipal Electoral Bureaus were composed on a similar 
basis. (IFES 2004, p.8) 
 
The recommendations of the USAID-funded Consortium regarding the future NEC 
emphasised the need to ensure the independence of that body, the transparency in the 
nomination and appointment procedures and guarantees of political pluralism from 
national to polling station levels. Moreover, the NEC should ensure that political 
parties have opportunities for input in the election management process:  and that the 
media has opportunities to report on the process.  The Consortium called for the 
release of the 1992 election report written by the NEC, which undoubtedly contains 
many lessons that would be helpful for all to study. One of the difficulties of adapting 
the 1992 NEC framework to current realities is the fact that the number of registered 
political parties has grown 6-fold, from 18 to 128. There should be a process of 
recertification which would weed out parties that no longer exist and also parties with 
insignificant representativity.  
Opportunities for assistance 
Compared to 1992, the current pre-electoral situation, more than a decade later and in 
a context of peace, will be different. One difference is that there is no need for the 
“mad rush for elections”, imposed by the need to secure the validity the Bicesse 
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Agreements and keep the momentum of that process. Another difference is that, for all 
the continued interest that reports such as the present one indicate, the international 
community is much less engaged in the internal affairs of Angola than it was until the 
conclusion of the Lusaka Agreements in 1994.  
 
In the coming months the international community will be entering into dialogue with 
the Government about whether or not international assistance will be required and 
what would be the nature and extent of those needs. In this context, there is need for a 
new assessment of the pre-electoral conditions in Angola (legal, material and 
institutional situation). Possibly, this might lead to a joint effort by the international 
donors, with technical backstopping from the United Nations Department of Political 
Affairs, integrating and coordinating the international community’s financial, material 
and technical contributions to the electoral process. Generally speaking, the most 
pressing needs might be for technical and civic training at all levels, to make sure that 
all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote free from coercion and in 
an informed and responsible manner. International observation of the elections will 
also play a crucial role in safeguarding and certifying the eventual success of the 
electoral process.  
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6. What can Norway do? 
The current strategic document for Norwegian assistance to Angola 
(Utenriksdepartementet  2003) was drafted as a stop gap document to enable Norway 
to respond to the needs and opportunities arising from the Luena cease fire, while 
waiting for elections. Although a calendar for the electoral process has now been 
adopted by the Government, not much progress has taken place regarding the 
clarification of the issues that were pending in 2002, and which can be summarized in 
one question: what will Angola look like politically after an electoral process? The 
answer to that question will to a large extent determine what is feasible and desirable 
in terms of the scope and nature of Norway’s official development assistance towards 
Angola. 
 
Much can happen between now and September 2006, and a number of unfavourable 
scenarios can be envisaged. The Angolan Government may decide that the political 
costs of transparency are too high and that it would rather abandon, at least 
temporarily, the road to a Donors’ Conference through the IMF Staff Monitored 
Programme. Or the political system may be thrown in turmoil if its main linchpin, José 
Eduardo dos Santos, who has ruled the party and the country for 25 years, is unable to 
continue providing cohesion and stability. Both scenarios would have serious and 
possibly adverse implications for development cooperation, particularly at the 
intergovernmental level.  
 
With the elections now postponed to September 2006, the most consistent course of 
action for Norway would be to continue its current “holding pattern” aid policy until 
2007. The 2003-2005 Strategy purports to focus on three objectives: national and 
regional security; democratic development and good governance; and, resource 
management that promotes poverty reduction, sustainable development and social 
development. It is hard to see in these very broad objectives anything that would limit 
Norway’s capacity to respond appropriately to any needs and opportunities for 
cooperation that might arise.  
 
Given the focus of this year’s report on the political situation in Angola, our 
perspectives and recommendations concern most particularly what Norway could do in 
this area, and are not meant to suggest that other aspects of Norwegian development 
assistance in the humanitarian and social development fields are less valuable or 
important.    
 
Our analysis suggests that the opposition parties would have great difficulty in leading 
the process of change in the foreseeable future. Even if the election is fair, and the 
opposition is given equitable chances of competing, MPLA will consolidate its grip on 
power. Given the institutional and ideological weaknesses of the opposition, and the 
stigma attached to having restarted the war, the strength of incumbency will prevail 
over the erosion of MPLA’s credibility among those voters who feel disappointed by 
the performance of the Government. Within this perspective, Norway should look for 
ways to encourage and, to the extent possible, support the forces of reform within 
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MPLA – people who would like Angola to become a more equitable, freer, and less 
corrupt society and less of an arena for predatory capitalism under authoritarian rule.  
 
Some analysts believe that the crucial elections are those that will eventually be held for 
local authorities – an extremely complex matter that the Government has been 
reluctant to address. At the local level, the political balance of forces will be different 
from the national level – due in part to the ethnic basis of political affinities and the 
territorially circumscribed power of traditional authorities. This could be an avenue for 
change, but not necessarily for the better, as discussed in last year’s CMI report in this 
series.  
 
One of the challenges in the area of promoting good governance and respect for human 
rights is how to operationalise concepts and approaches that are new or at least 
unusual, into actual practice. We found the Norwegian People’s Aid project to train the 
police in the province of Bengo in human rights issues particularly intriguing, not least 
because it was started in response to a request from the local police authorities, who 
saw a need for such training in the face of popular complaints. We recommend that a 
thorough evaluation of that project be undertaken in due course, with a view to assess 
its impact and eventual replicability. 
 
There is a high degree of consensus among Western and multilateral donors on the 
broad issues of conditionality, as articulated, for instance, in the EU Common Policy 
Statement quoted in chapter 3. This consensus is helpful, and Norway should continue 
to operate within and to support that policy framework. Through its national business 
interests in the oil sector in Angola, Norway is well placed to keep flagging issues of 
transparency and corporate social responsibility.  
 
As the colony of a country that was ruled for almost half a century by a fascist regime, 
Angola had less opportunity to learn about multiparty politics than the colonies of 
France or Britain. There is need to promote a democratic political culture and to 
improve the level of political discourse – which tends to remain focused on rumours 
and allegations concerning personalities. The Conference on the Transition to 
Multiparty Democracy organised by the Catholic University in August 2004 - which 
brought together politicians from all sides of the spectrum and academics for a serious 
but topical discussion in a non-partisan setting open to all - was a pioneering event of 
the kind that should be replicated. 
 
Of the three branches of government – executive, legislative and judiciary - the 
judiciary is the one that could most legitimately and effectively receive assistance from 
external sources8. The development needs of the Angolan law system are complex and 
extensive and run along two tracks: one is the reconciliation of customary and modern 
law, which will become increasingly important as development reaches hitherto remote 
or inaccessible regions, and brings into contact conflicting concepts of entitlement over 
natural resources, power, authority and personal freedoms, rights and obligations; the 
other is the strengthening of an independent and technically competent cadre of judges, 
without which it will be very hard to establish respect for the rule of law. These issues 
                                                 
8 While there is also a need to strenghten the Parliament in its functions and quality, and to promote the 
Parliament’s independence from the executive branch, the opportunities for non-partisan foreign 
assistance are more limited compared to the judiciary. 
  46 
have been explored only superficially in the context of Angola; in this area too, the 
need for policy-oriented research and reflection is vast and pressing. 
 
Serious political study, including technically sound polling and other data collection 
and analysis, should be encouraged. Although MPLA officials boast that the party has 
detailed political intelligence at the municipality level for the entire country, such data 
are not publicly available. The recent large-scale IRI/AIP study on people’s perceptions 
of political actors and issues (see chapter 3) was the first of its kind in Angola – and it 
is positive that Norway has supported the institutional and technical development of 
AIP, fostering the national capacity necessary to conduct such significant and ambitious 
tasks.  
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Annex 1: 
List of persons interviewed in Luanda 18-31 August 2004 
 
· Alfredo Teixeira, Senior Expert on Governance, UNDP 
· Alida Endresen, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy 
· Almerindo Jaka Jamba, Member of Parliament (UNITA), Vice-President of the 
National Assembly 
· André Kodizemba, Assistant to the President of FNLA  (Holden Roberto) 
· André Paulo, MP, Secretary for Information, FNLA 
· Ann Helen Perez Azedo, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy 
· Arne Øygard, Resident Representative, Norwegian People’s Aid (Norsk 
Folkehjelp) 
· Artur Quixona Finda, President, Partido Angolano Conservador do Povo 
(PACOPO) 
· Barbara Smith, Resident Programme Director for Electoral Affairs, NDI 
· Cesaltina Abreu, Researcher, AIP 
· Christine Wilkins, Associate Director, International Republican Institute 
(Angola) 
· Col. Correia de Barros, Vice-President of the Executive Board, Centro de 
Estudos Estratégicos de Angola 
· Dalmácio Benício, Economist, UNDP 
· David Mendes, President, Associação Mãos Livres 
· Domingo João, Paz e Democracia, Comité Intereclesial para a Paz em Angola 
(COIEPA)  
· Felisberto N’jele, Lt.-Gen. (Rtd), Project Director, Centro de Estudos 
Estratégicos de Angola 
· Fernando Viegas, Researcher, ADRA 
· Filomeno Vieira Lopes, Secretary General, FPD 
· Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, Professor Emeritus, African Studies Centre, ISCTE 
(interviewed in Lisbon, 2 August 2004) 
· Isabel S. Emerson, Country Director, National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs 
· João da Lama, Registration of Political Parties, Supreme Court 
· João de Almeida Azevedo Martins ”Jú”, Secretary of the MPLA Political Bureau 
for Political and Electoral Affairs 
· José Octávio Serra Van-Dúnem, Senior Researcher, AIP 
· Justino Pinto de Andrade, Director, Faculty of Economics and Management, 
Catholic University of Angola 
· Lindo Bernardo Tito, Member of Parliament, Leader of the PRS parliamentary 
group and National Secretary for Information 
· Lisa Rimli, Desk Officer, SwissPeace/”Drivers of Change Project” 
· Lopo do Nascimento, director of CESD, (fmr. Secretary-General of MPLA, fmr. 
Prime Minister, frm. Governor of Huíla) 
· Marcolino Moco, Fmr. Prime Minister 
· Martin Johnston, DFID Country Representative for Angola, British Embassy 
· Nina Strøm, Second Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy 
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· Pierre-François Pirlot, United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian 
Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative 
· Robert S. Miller, Country Director, International Republican Institute (Angola) 
· Roberto Soki, Member of the Political Bureau of FNLA 
· Rui Ferreira, Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Agostinho Neto 
University 
· Sven Even Froyn, Resident Representative, Norwegian Church Aid  
· Vitor Hugo Guilherme, Director, FAS and Officer-in-Charge, AIP 
· Willi Haan, Director, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
 
In addition to the above interviews, the author also attended a 2-day conference on 
”The Process of Transition to a Multiparty System in Angola”, co-organised by 
Departments of Economics of the Catholic University of Angola (UCAN) and Coimbra 
University, and held at UCAN on 19 and 20 August 2004. Speakers included, among 
others: 
 
· Paulo Jorge, Secretary for International Affairs, MPLA Political Bureau 
· Alex Vines, Director of the Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (London) 
· Abel Chivukuvuku, Member of Parliament and UNITA focal point for 
constitutional matters 
· Luis do Nascimento, Secretary-General of FPD 
· Fernando Pacheco, President of ADRA 
· Benjamim Castello, President of Jubileum 2000 Angola 
· Vicente Pinto the Andrade, Professor, UCAN and prospective presidential 
candidate 
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Annex 2: 
List of political parties by year of registration with the 
Supreme Court9 
The following is a list of the 126 political parties legally recognized in Angola, having 
met the criteria for registration with the Supreme Court laid down in the Law of 
Political Parties. The parties represented in the National Assembly are shown in bold.10 
It is believed that a number of these parties have ceased to exist, but there is no precise 
data about this since there is no mechanism to register the dissolution of political 
parties. 
 
 
Name of the party Year Reg. No. 
ADPA – Aliança para a Democracia dos Povos de Angola  1994 043 
ADTA – Aliança Democrática Trabalhista de Angola 1996 101 
AN – Aliança Nacional 1996 105 
AND – Aliança Nacional Democrática 1994 061 
ANIA – Aliança Nacional Independente de Angola  1997 120 
APIDA – Aliança do Povo Independente Democrático de Angola  1996 104 
CADA – Congresso da Aliança Democrática Angolana  1996 108 
CDS – Centro Democrático Social 1995 092 
CNA – Congresso Nacional Angolano 1996 098 
CNDA – Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola  1992 009 
FDA – Fórum Democrático Angolano 1992 003 
FEDA – Frente de Esperança para Democracia de Angola 1997 125 
FIJ – Fórum Integral Juvenil 1996 111 
FNDDA – Frente Nacional de Desenvolvimento Democrático de Angola  1994 045 
FNLA – Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola  1992 011 
FPD – Frente para a Democracia  1992 012 
FRESA/PJSD – Frente Juvenil de Salvação/Partido Juvenil da Social-
democracia 
1996 118 
FSDP – Frente Social Democrata para o Progresso 1995 088 
FULD – Frente Unida para Liberdade Democrática 1995 081 
FUPA – Frente Unida Pacífica de Angola 1995 085 
FUSA – Frente Unida de Salvação de Angola  1996 102 
MDA – Movimento Democrático de Angola  1994 049 
MDIA-PCN – Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola – Partido 
de Consciência Nacional 
1992 017 
MIDA – Movimento Independente Democrático de Angola  1995 079 
MND – Movimento Nacional Democrático 1996 100 
MNEP – Movimento Nacional para Estabilidade e Progresso 1995 065 
MPDA – Movimento para a Democracia de Angola 1995 067 
MPLA – Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 1992 001 
MPRSN – Movimento Patriótico Renovador da Salvação Nacional 1995 078 
PACIA – Partido Angolano Conservador da Identidade Africana 1992 023 
PACOPO – Partido Angolano Conservador do Povo 1995 091 
PADDA – Partido de Apoio para a Democracia e o Desenvolvimento de 1994 035 
                                                 
9 Based on information kindly provided by Mr. Caitano Sousa, Vice-President of the Supreme Court 
10 In addition to the 11 parties shown in bold, a coalition called AD-Coligação Democrática is also 
represented in Parliament with one member (from FPD)..  
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PADLA – Partidos da Aliança Democrática para a Liberdade de Angola 1994 063 
PADPA – Partido de Apoio Democrático e Progresso de Angola 1995 075 
PADS – Partido Angolano do Desenvolvimento Social  1994 044 
PAI – Partido Angolano Independente 1992 008 
PAID – Partido Angolano para os Interesses Democráticos 1994 032 
PAJOCA – Partido da Aliança Juventude, Operários e Camponeses de 
Angola 
1992 004 
PAL – Partido Angolano Liberal 1992 018 
PALDA – Partido de Apoio à Liberdade e Democracia Angolana  1994 058 
PALLA – Partido de Apoio à Liberdade Linguística de Angola  1996 115 
PALMA – Partido de Aliança Livre da Maioria Angolana 1994 051 
PAPPA – Partido da Aliança Pacífica e Progresso de Angola 1995 073 
PAR – Partido Angolano Republicano 1996 109 
PAUD – Partido Angolano para Unidade e Desenvolvimento 1994 050 
PAUDP – Partido Angolano para Unidade Democrática e Progresso  1994 057 
PAUS – Partido Angolano Unificado para Solidariedade 1995 087 
PC – Partido Conservador 1996 097 
PCA – Partido Congressista Angolano 1994 053 
PCCA – Partido da Comunidade Comunista Angolana 1994 056 
PCDA – Partido de Convergência Democrática Angolana 1994 038 
PCDP – Partido da Convenção Democrática e Progresso 1994 055 
PCN – Partido da Convergência Nacional 1995 084 
PCOP – Partido da Classe Operária e Camponesa 1996 096 
PCRA – Partido Comunista Renovador Angolano 1995 080 
PCSA –Partido da Comunidade Socialista Angolana 1995 083 
PDA – Partido Democrático de Angola  1992 015 
PDLA –Partido Democrático Liberal de Angola 1992 020 
PDN – Partido Democrático Nacional 1996 117 
PDOA – Partido do Desenvolvimento Operário Angolano 1995 090 
PDPA – Partido Democrático Pacífico de Angola  1992 013 
PDP-ANA – Partido Democrático para o Progresso – Aliança Nacional de 
Angola 
1992 014 
PDPS – Partido Democrático para o Progresso Social  1994 047 
PDRA – Partido Democrático Radical de Angola 1994 031 
PDS – Partido Democrático Social 1996 114 
PDT – Partido Democrático dos Trabalhadores 1995 093 
PDUA – Partido Democrático Unificado de Angola 1994 054 
PELA – Partido de Expressão Livre Angolana 1994 060 
PFDA – Partido Frente Democrática de Angola  1994 037 
PIR – Partido Independente Renovado 1994 052 
PLD – Partido Liberal Democrático 1992 016 
PLDSA – Partido Liberal Democrático para Solidariedade Angolana  1995 086 
PLPA – Partido Liberal para o Progresso de Angola  1995 074 
PLUN – Partido Liberal para Unidade Nacional 1996 099 
PMD – Partido de Massas Democráticas 1996 119 
PN – Partido Nacional 1995 071 
PNCA – Partido Nacional dos Camponeses Angolanos 1996 103 
PNDA – Partido Nacional Democrático de Angola 1992 010 
PNEA – Partido Nacional Ecológico de Angola  1994 046 
PNIA – Partido Nacional Independente de Angola  1994 041 
PNPA – Partido Nacional e Progressista de Angola  1994 040 
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PNSA – Partido Nacional de Salvação de Angola 1996 094 
POSDA – Partido Operário Social Democrático Angolano 1995 072 
PPA – Partido Pacífico Angolano 1996 113 
PPDA – Partido Progressista Democrático de Angola  1993 029 
PPDLA – Partido Progressista Democrático Liberal de Angola  1995 064 
PPSD – Partido Popular Social Democrata 1996 107 
PRA – Partido Renovador Angolano 1992 021 
PRCA – Partido Republicano Conservador Angolano 1996 095 
PRD – Partido Renovador Democrático 1992 006 
PRE – Partido Restaurador da Esperança 1995 066 
PREA – Partido Republicano de Angola 1997 121 
PRJA – Partido Republicano da Juventude de Angola 1994 059 
PRN – Partido de Reconstrução Nacional 1996 112 
PRPA – Partido de Reunificação do Povo Angolano 1996 116 
PRS – Partido de Renovação Social 1992 007 
PRSD – Partido Republicano Social Democrático 1994 048 
PSA – Partido Socialista de Angola  1994 033 
PSCA – Partido da Solidariedade e de Consciência de Angola 1992 026 
PSD – Partido Social Democrata 1992 005 
PSDA – Partido Social Democrático Angolano 1992 019 
PSIA – Partido Social Independente de Angola 1995 082 
PSL – Partido Socialista Liberal  1993 030 
PSN – Partido da Salvação Nacional  1995 089 
PSPA – Partido Social da Paz de Angola 1994 036 
PTA – Partido Trabalhista de Angola 1995 068 
PUDAD – Partido da Unidade Democrática de Angola 1997 124 
PUFRAS – Partido para Unidade e Fraternidade Social 1997 125 
PUNA – Partido para Unidade Nacional de Angola 1994 042 
PUP – Partido Unido do Povo 1995 077 
PURA – Partido Unido dos Renovadores Angolanos 1996 110 
TRD – Tendência de Reflexão Democrática 1994 034 
UAPDD – União Angolana pela Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento 1995 076 
UDA – Unificação Democrática de Angola 1992 024 
UDNA – União Democrática Nacional de Angola 1995 070 
UDPA – União Democrática dos Povos de Angola 1994 062 
ULDA – Unidade Liberal Democrática Angolana 1995 069 
UNA-PT – União Nacional Angolana – Partido da Terra 1996 106 
UND – União Nacional para a Democracia  1992 022 
UNDP - União Nacional para Democracia e Progresso 1993 028 
UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola  1992 002 
UNLDDA – União nacional da Luz para a Democracia e 
Desenvolvimento de Angola  
1992 025 
UNPD – União Nacional para a Democracia  1993 027 
UNRD – União Nacional da Resistência Democrática 1997 123 
UPA – União do Povo Angolano 1997 122 
USD- União Social Democrática 1994 039 
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Annex 3: 
The Millennium Development Goals and related targets 
Target 1 Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than $1 a day  
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger 
Target 2 Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger 
Goal 2 Achieve universal primary 
education 
Target 3 Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling 
Goal 3 Promote gender equality 
and empower women 
Target 4 Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education preferably by 2005 and in all 
levels of education no later than 2015 
Goal 4 Reduce child mortality Target 5 Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the 
under-five mortality rate 
Goal 5 Improve maternal health Target 6 Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, 
the maternal mortality ratio 
Target 7 Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS 
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other 
diseases Target 8 Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases 
Target 9 Integrate the principles of sustainable development 
into country policies and program and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources 
Target 10 Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation 
Goal 7 Ensure environmental 
sustainability 
Target 11 Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement 
in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
Target 12 Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, 
non-discriminatory trading and financial system 
(includes a commitment to good governance, 
development, and poverty reduction—both 
nationally and internationally) 
Target 13 Address the special needs of the least developed 
countries (includes tariff-and quota -free access for 
exports enhanced program of debt relief for HIPC 
and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more 
generous ODA for countries committed to poverty 
reduction) 
Target 14 Address the special needs of landlocked countries 
and small island developing states (through the 
Program of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States and 
22nd General Assembly provisions) 
Target 15 Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of 
developing countries through national and 
international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term 
Target 16 In cooperation with developing countries, develop 
and implement strategies for decent and productive 
work for youth 
Target 17 In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, 
provide access to affordable, essential drugs in 
developing countries 
Goal 8 Develop a global 
partnership for 
development 
Target 18 In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications 
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Summary 
 
 
The present report is the fifth in a series of annual studies carried 
out by the Chr. Michelsen Institute on socio-economic and 
political trends in Angola, at the request of the Norwegian 
development cooperation authorities. This year’s report focuses 
on the political situation in Angola, in the context of the 
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections – the first since 
1992. 
In 2003-2004 Angola continued to make notable progress 
in its socio-economic recovery from nearly three decades of war. 
But the most significant event on the political arena was the 
announcement that the ruling regime would consent to hold 
elections in 2006, fourteen years after the first – and so far, only - 
multiparty elections in the country’s history. The present report 
discusses the roles of the various actors in the political process, 
including the attitudes and expectations of the population, which 
were recently the object of a pioneering opinion poll conducted by 
AIP. A sobering message is that elections – however essential to 
the democratisation process – is not likely to result in less power 
for the current president and his party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0805-505X 
ISBN 82-8062-095-8 
 
Recent Reports 
 
 
 
R 2004: 10 SØREIDE, Tina 
Corruption in international business transactions: The perspective of Norwegian firms . Bergen, 
2004, 60 pp. 
R 2004: 9 Report from a Symposium at Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway 24-25 May 
2004 
  Palestinian State-formation: Prospects and challenges. Bergen, 2004, 14 pp. 
R 2004: 8 BWALYA, Edgar, Lise Rakner, et al. 
  Poverty reduction strategy processes in Malawi and Zambia. Bergen, 2004, 33 pp. 
R 2004: 7 SPISSØY, Arild 
 Selskapers sosiale ansvarlighet. En teoretisk analyse og empirisk undersøkelse av 
bedrifter i Malaysia. Bergen, 2004, 66 pp. 
R 2004: 6 MILFORD, Anna 
Coffee, co-operatives and competition: The impact of Fair Trade. Bergen 2004, 76 pp. 
R.2004: 5 STOKKE, Hugo et al. 
  “Looking for Trouble…” An evaluation of International Media Support (IMS): 
Exploring a model for rapid response to threatened media. Bergen, 2004, 106 pp. 
R 2004: 4 SUHRKE, Astri, Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne Strand 
  Conflictual peacebuilding: Afghanistan two years after Bonn. Bergen, 2004, 106 pp. 
R 2004: 3 ISAKSEN, Jan 
SADC in 2003: Restructuring and Progress in Regional Integration. Bergen, 2004, 30 pp. 
R 2004: 2 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Espen Villanger 
How does social development affect FDI and domestic investment? Bergen, 2004, 33 pp. 
R 2004: 1 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Espen Villanger 
 Social development and industry level foreign direct investment. Bergen, 2004, 47 pp. 
R 2003: 14 ANDERSEN, Susanne Rislå 
The influence and effects of financial development on economic growth. Bergen, 2003, 
44 pp. 
R 2003: 13 JACOBSEN, Karen F. Lomeland 
  Telecommunications – a means to economic growth in developing countries? 
  Bergen, 2003, 53 pp. 
R 2003: 12 TJØNNELAND, Elling N. 
  Norway and security sector reform in developing countries. Bergen, 2003, 52 pp. 
R 2003: 11 STRAND, Arne et al. 
Community driven development in contexts of conflict. Concept paper. Commissioned 
by ESSD, World Bank. Bergen, 2003, 68 pp. 
R 2003: 10 TVEDTEN, Inge et al. 
 Angola 2002/2003. Key development issues and democratic decentralisation. Bergen, 
2003, 78 pp. 
R 2003: 9 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge, Ivar Kolstad and Siri Lange 
 Autonomy, incentives and patronage. A study of corruption in the Tanzania and 
Uganda revenue authorities. Bergen, 2003, 84 pp. 
R 2003: 8 LANGE, Siri 
 When women grow wings: Gender relations in the informal economy of Kampala. 
Bergen, 2003, 30 pp. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMI’s publications, Annual Report and quarterly newsletters are available on CMI's homepage www.cmi.no 
